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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
April 15, 1983 Conference
List 3, Sheet 2
Cert to CA 1
(Davis, Campbell and Bownes)

No. 82-1246

6'( Bose

Corporation

v.
Federal/ Civil

Consumers Union
1. SUMMARY:

Timely

Petr argues that the CA improperly overturned

the DC's factual findings.
2.

FACTS AND DECISION BELOW:

901, a loudspeaker system.

Petr manufactures the Bose

The Bose 901 is unique in that the

majority of its speakers are directed away from the listener.

By

bouncir1g the sound off the walls of the room, the Bose 901 attempts
to create a fuller and more realistic sound.

Resp, the publisher of

Consumer Reports, wrote an article entitled "Loudspeakers," in which
it evaluated the quality and performance of the Bose 901.

The

article explained the Bose 90l's unique design and stated that the
design caused the sound to have a more expansive quality than was
justified.

After noting the speaker's expansive effect on

orchestral works, the article stated, "Worse, individual instruments
"-'?

heard through the Bose system seemed to grow to gigantic proportions
and tended to wander around the room.

For instance a violin

appeared to be 10 feet wide and a piano stretched from wall to
wall."

The article caused Bose to v(ose several customers and

resulted in a suit by Bose for product disparagement.
The DC found that the statement that the sounds "tended to
wander around the room" was both false and disparaging.

The experts

who had conducted the test and written the article had testified
that while there was some distortion of the sound, the distortion
was confined to an area within a few feet of the speakers.

Thus,

the description of the sound as wandering about the room was
impermissible hyperbole.

The DC noted that proof that the statement

was false and disparaging ordinarily would be sufficient to
establish product disparagement.

Because, however, this suit arose

because of resp's publication, the DC found that it was required to
consider the suit's impact on resp's First Amendment rights.

It

determined that because Bose was a public figure, New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376

o.s.

154 (1964), required proof of actual malice.

this case, actual malice existed because the expert who wrote the

In

article was too intelligent not to know that his words were not an
accurate description of the limited distortion produced by the Bose
901.

The CA reveresed.

It did not decide the issue raised by

resp that the statement was an opinion and therefore not capable of
being false.

Instead, it assumed that the statement was both a

factual description and false.

It noted also that petr conceded

both that New York Times v. Sullivan applied in this context and
that the DC properly had concluded that petr was a public figure.
It found, however, that the DC incorrectly had determined that
resp's statement had been published with actual knowledge that it
was false or with reckless disregard for its falsity.

In making

this determination, the CA found that it was not bound by the
clearly erroneous standard.

Relying on Sullivan, supra, at 285, and

n. 26, it treated this issue as a mixed question of fact and law.
It noted that resp had been extremely careful in reviewing the
article and that there was no reason to say that it knew either that
the description was not accurate or that the wording was imprecise.
On petn for rehearing, petr argued that the CA had
considered only whether the editorial board had known that the
article was false.

It should have considered the author's

knowledge, and any fault on the author's part should be attributed
to the publisher.

The CA denied the petn, stating that it had

considered the state of mind of both the author and the editorial
board that reviewed the article.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

Petr argues that the CA improperly

failed to apply the clearly erroneous standard to the DC's finding

of actual knowledge.

The CA9 has applied the clearly erroneous

standard in a similar situation.
692 F.2d 634 (CA9 1982).

See Cher v. Forum International,

Petr contends that New York Times v.

Sullivan, which petr relied on for its standard of review, does not
stand for the proposition that a court is free to ignore Rule 52(a).
In this case, the CA improperly failed to accept the DC's
determination that the author's statement that the sound tended to
wander around the room was not an accurate description of his
perceptions.
Resp states that the DC based its determination that the
statements were false and disparaging on the difference between the
published phrase, "tended to wander about the room" and the author's
testimony that the sound "tended to wander about [or along] the
wall."

TheCA properly exercised an independent duty, first

identified in New York Times v. Sullivan, to undertake an
independent examination to determine if the difference between these
two statements established that the published statement had been
made with actual malice.
4.

DISCUSSION:

The CA properly concluded that it did not.
The CA's statement that it

shou ~treat

the question of malice as a mixed question of law and fact finds
support in Sullivan, in which the Court expressly undertook an
independent review of the evidence to determine if there were proof
of actual malice.
and Cher, supra.

There is some tension, however, between this case
In Cher, the CA stated that it had examined the

record with the special care that is appropriate in First Amendment
cases, but ultimately applied the clearly erroneous standard to the
DC's determination that actual malice did not exist.

While there is

some tension between the two cases, the conflict is not pronounced.
Further, the difference between the published statement and the

-

author's testimony here appears so minimal that the DC's
determination that it was false almost appears clearly erroneous.
I recommend denial.
04/11/83
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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
BOSE

~

CORPORATION v. CONSUMERS
UNION OF THE UNITED STATES, INC.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 82-1246.

Decided April-, 1983

dissenting:
Petitioner Bose Corporation is a manufacturer of stereo
loudspeaker systems. In the May, 1970, issue of Consumer
Reports, respondent Consumers Union of ~tf, Inc., the United States
published a review of one of petitioner's products, the Bose
901 Series I loudspeaker system. Petitioner brought suit for
damages alleging, among other things, product di~arage- /
ment. Following extensive discovery ana a 19 day bench •
trial, the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts determined that at least one statement in the
review was both disparaging and false. The District Court
also found that the "actual malice" standard of New York
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1976), applied to product
disparagement claims and that petitioner was a "public
figure." 1
-:1tpplying the "actual malice" standard, the District Court
held that petitioner had "sustained its burden of proving that
the [respondent] published a false statement of material fact
with the knowledge that it was false or with reckless disreJUSTICE WHITE,

1
The propriety of the District Court's determinations that petitioner
was a "public figure" and that the "actual malice" standard applied to product disparagement suits was not before the Court of Appeals; neitheno:K
~~~~ presented in the petition for certiorari.
In addition,
because the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court judgment on
other grounds, it assumed without deciding both that the statement in
question was a fact rather than an opinion, and that the statement was
false. The propriety of the District Court's decision on these issues is not
before the Court.

issue is

2

BOSE CORPORATION v. CONSUMERS UNION

gard of its truth or falsity." 508 F. Supp. 1249, 1277 (1981).
The court expressly found that the author of the review knew
that the article did not accurately describe the performance
of petitioner's speaker system. Ibid. Respondent sought
review of the District Court's decision and the Court of Appeals reversed.
~
Despite our clear pronouncements that 'Rule 52 broadly
requires that findings of fact not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous," and that the Rule "does not make exceptions or
purport to exclude certain categories of factual findings from
the obligation of a Court of Appeals to accept a district
court's findings unless clearly erroneous," Pullman-Standard v. Swint, - - U. S. - - (1982), the Court of Appeals
found that it was "not limited to the clearly erroneous standard of Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)" in revieWing e is net Court's
finding that there was actual knowledge of falsity in this case.
692 F. 2d 189, 195 (1982). After conducting a de novo review
of the record, the Court of Appeals concluded that it "could
not find clear and convincing evidence that [respondent] published the statement . . . with knowledge that it was
false .... " !d., at 197.
Our prior First Amendment cases provide no basis for the / '
Court of Appeals' explicit rejection of Rule 52. In New York \
Times v. Sullivan,~hat the review to
which a lower court's decision is subject is the determination
"whether governing rules of federal law have been properly
applied to the facts." 376 U. S., at 285 n. 26. See Time,
Inc. v. Pape, 401 U. S. 279, 284 (1971) ("[t]he only question
before us . . . is whether the Court of Appeals correctly applied the [actual malice] rule to the facts of this case.")
When an historical fact has been found by a District Court, a
Court of Appeals must accept that finding unless it is clearly
erroneous. There is no doubt that actual knowlege of falsity
is an historical fact and is constitutionally sufficient to support the legal conclusion that a statement has been published
with "actual malice."
The Court of Appeals' express rejection of the clearly erroneous standard of review for an historical fact cannot be

I

I
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3

squared with either our prior First Amendment cases or our
recent decisions concerning the applicability of Rule 52. Because I believe that the Court of Appeals has applied the
wrong standard of review in this case and has purported to
carve out an exception to the clearly erroneous standard that
is not warranted by Rule 52 or prior case law, I would grant
the petition for certiorari in this case, vacate the judgment of
the Court of Appeals and remand for reconsideration in light
of Pullman-Standard v. Swint, - - U. S. - - (1982).

drk 04/21/83
'
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To: Mr. Justice Powell

From:

Rives

Re: No. 81-1246, Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union

The premise underlying Justice White's dissent from denial
of cert, that a CA must accept a DC's factual findings unless they
are clearly erroneous, is well-settled.

But it is not as clear as

his dissent suggests that it applies in this case.

The CA treated

the DC's factual finding of actual malice as a mixed question of law
and fact.

It therefore examined whether the basic or historical

facts found by the DC supported its conclusion that there was actual
malice.

This appears to be the main point with which Justice

White's dissent takes issue.
If there were no prior cases on this point, I would be
inclined to agree with Justice White's determination that actual
malice is a determination of historic fact.
Times v. Sullivan, 376
opposite conclusion.

u.s.

As I read New York

254, however, it seems to suggest the

In the context of determining whether there

was actual malice, it noted:
But [the Seventh Amendment's] ban on reexamination of
facts does not preclude us from determining whether
governing rules of federal law have been properly applied
to the facts.
'[T)his Court will review the finding of
facts by a State court .•• where a conclusion of law as to
a Federal right and a finding of fact are so intermingled
as to make it necessary, in order to pass upon the Federal
question, to analyze the facts."' Id., at 285, n. 26.

It also stated in text:
"This Court's duty is not limited to the elaboration of
constitutional principles; we must also in proper cases
review the evidence to make certain that those principles
have been constitutionally applied. • • • [T] he rule is that
we 'examine for ourselves the statements in issue and the
circumstances in which they were made to see ••• whether
they are of a character which the principles of the First
Amendment ••• protect.'" Id., at 285.
Sullivan then proceeded to apply a rather searching scrutiny to
determine whether actual malice had been proved.

To me, it seems as

if Sull1van treated th1s question as if it were a mixed question of
law and fact.
While I do not necessarily agree with this treatment, it
seems that there is sufficient doubt that a GVR in light of Pullman
Standard v. Swint, ___

u.s. ___

(1982), is not appropriate.

This is

especially so since Pullman Standard expressly reserved the question
of whether the clearly erroneous standard applied to mixed questions
of law and fact.
Finally, this does not seem a good case to grant.

The

author of the article testified that the quality of the sound was
distorted by the design of the speakers.
distortion, he exaggerated its effect.

In describing the
While he knew that the sound

did not stretch from wall to wall, he used hyperbole to communicate
in a short-hand way the quality of the sound.

It is not clear to me

that the use of a figure of speech demonstrates actual malice.

It

seems that it would be no different if the author had perceived that
the Bose speakers had a raspy quality and described them as sounding
as if they were filled with gravel.

Obviously, he would know that

there was no gravel in the speakers but would have employed a
metaphor to convey his impression of their sound.

Because the

underlying controversy seems to me relatively minor, I would not
think this case would merit plenary consideration, nor would I think
that the law is sufficiently clear to support a GVR in light of
Pullman Standard.
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Bench Memorandum
No. 82-1246
BOSE CORP. V. CONSUMERS UNION OF UNITED STATES
Robert M. Couch

October 27, 1983

Argument scheduled for Tues., November 8, 1983.

Question Presented

Whether
review of
case.

..

the clearly erroneous standard applies to appellate
a

TC's

finding

of

actual malice

in a

1st Amendment
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I.

BACKGROUND

A.

Statutes

Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) states, in relevant part: "Findings of
fact

shall not be set as ide

regard

unless

clearly erroneous,

and due

shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to

judge of the credibilty of the witnesses."

B.

Facts

Petr is a maker of loudspeakers.

A May 1970 issue of Consumer

Reports, . a publication owned by resp, ran an article on speakers.
The

article

reported on one of petr 's products,

the Bose 901.

The article stated, in part:
"But after listening to a number of recordings, it became apparent that the panelists could pinpoint the
location of various instruments much more easily with a
standard speaker system than with the Bose system.
Worse, individual instruments heard through the Bose
system seemed to grow to gigantic proportions and tended to wander about the room.
For instance, a violin
appeared to be 10 feet wide and a piano stretched from
wall to wall.
With orchestral music, such effects
seemed inconsequential. But we think they might become
annoying when listening to soloists.... We think the
Bose system is so unusual that a prospective buyer must
listen to it and judge it for himself."
Apparently, petr lost several customers because of the article.
(As I understand it, purchasers of high-priced speakers want to

. they are
hear the sounds of individual instruments to seem' as 1f
coming from only one location.

In effect, the listener wants the

stereo to make him think he is in a concert hall with the various

,t,._

instrument arrayed before him.

If the sounds of the instruments

"wander," the sound is less than reali~tic.

My tin ears deprive
~

~,

me of the ability to understand this concern.)

~
C.

Decisions Below

After unsuccessful attempts to get resp to retract the article and to substantiate its criticism, petr sued resp for product
disparagement,

unfair competition,

Act.

and violations of the Lanham

bench trial,

Seligson,

testified

that

another man, Lefkow.
dering"

of

sounds

the

the author of the article, /

"panel"

cons is ted

of

himself

and

The two panelists admitted that the "wan-

that

they

heard

during

the

listening

tests

could be pinpointed to only the area directly between the speakers.

Seligson testified that when he used the term "about the

room" he meant "along the wall".
that some sounds

Lefkow explained the conclusion

from the speakers

"tended to wander about the

room" as meaning that instrumental sounds moved along "the rear
wall between the speakers."
The trial court dismissed the unfair competition and Lanham
Act claims,

~ying
~L

pv

that

but

found

that

the

the

speakers made

article had
sounds wander

The TC found, however, that petr was

~..£.-~~ ~f

,.~its

the 1st Amendment.

disparaged petr by
"about

~l public figur ~

Therefo:::- resp could

the

room."

for purposes

b~eld

liable for

statements only if they were made with actual malice.

The TC

noted that "actual malice" is defined as knowledge that the published statement is false or reckless disregard of its truth or

falsity.
{1964).

See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376

u.s.

254,

268

After finding that the author'~ explanation of the "wan-

der about the room" statement was not credible, the TC found that
the statement "did not accurately describe the effects that he
and Lefkow had heard during the
TC

also

referred

defamatory
tained

to Lefkow' s

statement.

"clear

and

damages phase of

The

'special listening test'."

contradictory

TC concluded

convincing proof"

of

explanation of

that

the

record

actual malice.

the trial the TC set the damages and

At

The
the
conthe

interest

from the disparagement at about $211,000.
On appeal, the CAl stated that the TC had some basis for its
implicit finding that the statements in the article would be read
as factual assertions rather than opinions.
the statements were factual and false.

The CAl assumed that

The CAl approved the TC's

--

. ' \ regu1r.
The CAl also agreed that petr is a public f1gure

ry.

The CAl limited its review to the question of whether the

~~~

finding that the "wandering about the room" statement was dispara ging.

"

ing the application of the New York Times "actual malice" inqui-

statement was made with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of its truth or falsity.

The CAl stated:

"In performing this review we are not limited to the
Qlearly errQ_neous standard of Fed. R. Civ. P. 52 (a};
instead, .... we must perform a de novo review, independently exam!n1ng fhe recora to ensure tfiat the district
court has applied properly the governing constitutional
law and that the plaintiff has indeed satisfied its
burden of proof."
692 F. 2d, at 195, citing New York
Times, 376 U.S., at 285 & n.26 and Time, Inc. v. Pape,
401 u.s. 279, 284 {1971).

~

~

The CAl noted that in conducting its review, it was not in a po- (;{
sition to consider the credibility of witnesses.
no more discussion to the standard of review.

The CAl devoted

Regarding
plaintiff

the actual malice standard,

must

show

that

the

defendant

the CAl noted that a
made

the

disparaging

statement "with a high degree of awareness of probable falsity"
or that the defendant"entertained serious doubts as to the truth
of his publication."

The CAl noted that a plaintiff must present

"clear and convincing" proof of actual malice because of the importance of the rights involved in a 1st Amendment case.

The CAl

stated that its review of the evidence did not support the infert I

ence of actual malice.

'

p~

_/

The CAl noted that resp had used experts '~

to conduct tests on petr's speaker and that resp had not

deviated _~,
IL~~-

from

its

normal

editorial procedures.

The CAl concluded:

"The

evidence presented merely shows that the words in the article may
not have described precisely what the two panelists heard during
the listening test."

II.

DISCUSSION

A. Petitioner's Contentions

The essence of petr 's argument

is that the CAl should have

employed a clearly erroneous standard in its review of the TC's
finding of actual malice.
case

Petr

submits

that the fact that the

involves 1st Amendment protections does not alter

quirement that a TC's findings of fact
of knowing

falsity or

the re-

(in this case the finding

reckless disregard

for

the truth)

can be

set aside only upon a finding of clear error by the court of ap-

peals.

The Court's opinion in New York Times does not alter this

rule.

Petr contends

that

the CAl's

failure

to adhere to this

rule amounted to an unconstitutional taking of petr's property (
i.e., the right to seek redress for product disparagement).
argues

that

the

record

indicates

that

the TC

was

not

Petr

clearly

wrong in its finding of actual malice.

B. Respondent's Contentions

Resp argues

that the Court held

in New York Times that the

independent appellate review of a TC's findings regarding "actual
malice" is not only proper but required.
factfinder would have
mental

Otherwise, the initial

"unreviewable final authority over funda-

First Amendment

freedoms."

Resp submits

that the CAl's

review in this case was not de novo because the court did not
redetermine disputed facts or review the credibility of witnesses.

The question of actual malice is a mixed question of law and

fact, so independent appellate review was proper.
In any event,

the TC's finding was reversible under a clear

error standard of review, according to resp.
testimony

of

than

subjective

the

the

panelists

using

standard

an

required

The TC weighed the

objective
in

standard

rather

lst Amendment

cases.

Finally, resp contends that the TC's finding of actual malice was
clearly erroneous.

c.

Analysis

This case boils down to whether a court of appeals is bound
by the clear error rule in 1st Amendment cases.

Despite resp's

protestations to the contrary, the legal standard used by the TC
is not

subject

As the CAl pointed out,

to attack.

the actual

malice standard propounded in New York Times applied to this case
and the TC applied that standard.

The TC did not find that the

reasonable man would have believed the "wandering about the room"
statement

to

be

credibility and

untrue.
demeanor

Instead,
of

-

the

TC,

the witnesses,

after
found

weighing

the

that Seligson

and Lefkow knew that the speakers did not make sounds that wandered about the room and that Seligson published a statement that
was inaccurate.

In response to Seligson's testimony that he be-

lieved that the "wandering about the room" phrase meant the same
thing as "wandering along the rear wall," the TC, in effect, held
that he was lying.

The standard used by the TC was subjective,

not objective as argued by resp.

Thus, the narrow question in

this case is whether the CA~l should have adhered to Rule 52.
The CAl decision to conduct an independent review of the evidence is understandable.

In New York Times, the Court was faced

with review of a state court's award of libel damages against the
New York Times for an advertisement it published.

The advertise-

ment listed several attrocities perpetrated against black activists in the South during the early '60s and requested financial
support for Martin Luther King.

The Times's liability was predi-

cated on a presumption under Alabama law of actual malice where

general damages were proven.

The Court stated that such a pre-

sumption was unconstitutional and that the 1st Amendment requires
a clear and convincing showing of actual malice.

The Court went

on to state: "Since respondent may seek a new trial, we deem that
considerations of effective judicial administration require us to
review the evidence in the present record to determine whether it
could constitutionally support a

u.s.,

at 284-285.

judgment for

respondent."

376

Read alone this statement seems to indicate

that the Court was willing to undertake review of the facts of
the case only because the facts were so clear that a remand would
be a waste of time.
to conduct an

The Court, however, explained its decision

independent review of

l

the facts on significantly

broader grounds:
"This Court's duty is not limited to the elaboration of
constitutional principles: we must also in proper cases
review the evidence to make certain that those principles have been constitutionally applied.
This is such
a case, particularly since the question is one of alleged trespass across 'the line between speech unconditionally guaranteed and speech which may legitimately
be regulated.'
In cases where that line must be drawn,
the rule is that we 'examine for ourselves the statements ~ the c1rcumstances under which they
were maoe to- see . . . whether they are of a character
which the principles of the First Amendment, as adopted
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
protect.'
We must 'make an independent examination of
the whole record,' so as to assure ourselves that the
judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on
the field of free expression."
Id., at 285 (citations
omitted}.
-

!

The Court noted that the 7th Amendment precludes reexamination of
facts found by juries, but stated that "[the 7th Amendment's] ban
on re-examination of facts does not preclude us from determining
whether governing rules of federal law have been properly applied
to the facts."

Id., at 285 n.26.

Justice White seized on this

7
J

language in his dissent from denial of cert that he wrote before
cert was granted
New York Times

In that dissent he stated that

in this case.

stands

for

the proposition that a court

is not

/J/(IJ
~
~

subject to the clear error rule only in its determination whether ~
~

--------

Justice White stated
the TC applied an actual malice standard.
~----~~-----------------that a finding of ~ctual malic ~ is a finding of historical fact

~f~

and, therefore, covered by Rule 52.
~

I do not

a~ e w ~ti~e

~he

Court in that case expressly held: "As to the Times, we simi-

Whites reading of New York Times.

~fiv;~y conclude that the facts do not support a finding of actual

~~lice."

AI Ll r

at 286.

The Court's discussion indicates that the

reviewed the evidence in the case and reached its own conthe existence of actual malice.
construed New York Times in the same fashion.
Pape, 401

u.s.

authority for

Other cases have
In Time,

Inc. v.

279, 284 (1971), the Court cited New York Times as
its review of the evidence in the case "to deter-

mine whether it could constitutionally support a judgment for the
plaintiff."!

See also Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Assn. v.

Bresler,

u.s.

§580A,

398

comment g

6,

11

(1970)

~VRestatement

(Second)

of

Torts

(1981). 2 Resp cites several courts of appeals'

1 Justice White's dissent from denial of cert also contains a
selective quote from the Time, Inc. opinion. He reads that
J.9f(GAf
opinion as only authorizing independent review of evidence to
determine whether the proper constitutional standard was applied.
2comment g to §580A states: "The United States Supreme Court
..,()'r""~
has on several occasions reviewed the evidence to decide whether ~~
the evidence justified a finding of knowledge or reckless
disregard, and it has not hesitated to hold that the
constitutional requirement of proof with convincing clarity has
Footnote continued on next page.

52-54.
Although I disagree with Justice White's reading of New York
Times, I agree with the point of his dissent.
ard v.

Swint,

456

u.s.

273

address the scope of Rule 52.

(1982),

In Pullman Stand-

the Court had occas~ion to

The Court pointed out that Rule 52

does not distinguish between "ultimate" and "subsidiary" facts.
Id., at 287.
fact

l\

comes

3

...... .
,,

The Court stated that whenever a question of pure

up,

the

clear

error

rule

aeplies.

As

examples

of

~

questions of pure fact, the Court mentioned cases involving questions of intent, design, or motive.

-----

Id., at 288.

The question of whether a statement is made with knowledge of (
falsity or with

a

reckless disregard for

the truth

much a question of pure fact as the issue of intent.

is

just as )

If the mak-

er has the requisite state of mind, actual malice exists.

There

can be no misapplication of the standard, only an incorrect determination of the state of mind.

Thus, the question is one of

fact, rather than a mixed question of fact and law.

See id., at

289.
Moreover, the trier of fact is particularly suited to deciding such questions.

~

The most effective way of determining some-

one's knowledge of a subject is to ask him a relevant question
and observe his demeanor when he answers.
~
not been met, despite the jury verdict."

His demeanor becomes

~'$C/Il

,

.&jt-''~

3 The Court expressly did not address the issue of the
~ ~/
application of Rule 52 to questions of mixed law and fact.
'-

even more important when he is confronted with tangible evidence
that seemingly contradicts his statements.

The TC is in the best

position to view the evidence and hear the testimony of witnesses.

This

is

the policy underlying

Inwood Laboratories,

Inc.

v.

the clear' · error

Ives Laboratories,

rule.

Inc.,

456

See

u.s.

844, 855 (1982).
independent appellate review of evidence is not ~
~
an efficient use of judicial resources. Courts of appeals should
In addition,

not have to plough

through extensive trial records in order to

reevaluate factual findings of TCs.

The taxing effect of inde-

pendent review is particularly acute in this area.
a

tendency

to

fight

unfavorable

verdicts

rather

The media has
than

settle

cases.
I
cases,

see no reason for Rule 52 not to apply
particularly

where

the

case

does

court's application of the 1st Amendment.
with great regularity,

not

in 1st Amendment
involve

a

state

As the cases point out

the 1st Amendment is so important and so

fragile that extra care must be taken to see that it is not violated.

That is the reason that the Court has imposed the actual

malice standard
standard.

in 1st Amendment cases rather

than some lesser

More importantly, the Court requires that actual mal-

ice be shown by clear and convincing proof instead of the preponderance of the evidence standard used in most civil cases.

These

unique characteristics of 1st Amendment jurisprudence reflect the
Court's feeling that it is more important to allow the publication of falsities

in good faith than to encourage undue caution

in statements regarding public affairs.

See New York Times, 376

u.s.,

at 279.

Nevertheless, allowing independent review of evi-

dence

at

appellate

each

Amendment
tion,

that no other

courts

of

appeal

clear error rule.

stage

confers

protections

on

constitutional rights enjoy.
are

not

foreclosed

from

the

1st

In addi-

review

by

the

A court of appeal can set aside a finding of

fact under Rule 52 if it "is left with the definite and firm conviction

that

a

mistake has

been committed."

United States Gypsum Co., 333
think the CAl was wrong.
square my conclusion with

u.s.

364, 395 (1948).

At the same time,
the

United

language

seems to sanction independent review of

States v.
In short, I

I don't know how to

in New York Times that
facts

in 1st Amendment

cases. 4
Both parties devote substantial portions of their briefs arguing over whether the TC's finding of actual malice was clearly
erroneous.
the

clear

If
error

the Court decides
standard,

I

that the CAl should have used

think the that the case should be

4 one possible way to distinguish New York Times and Time, Inc.
is the fact that in both cases the lower courts had not applied
the correct standards to the facts of the case.
In New York
Times, actual malice was presumed.
In Time, Inc., the court of
appeals had interpreted the term "actual malice" too broadly.
Although the Court in both cases undertook detailed review of the
evidence and broadly stated that unlimited review is proper in
1st Amendment cases, the Court could adopt Justice White's view
that independent review is proper only where the lower courts
have misapplied legal standards.
In such cases it does not make
sense to defer to the lower courts' factual findings because the
lower court has made those findings with reference to an
erroneous standard. Because the lower court has misapplied a
legal standard, the concomitant factual findings may be flawed as
well. Thus, I think the Court can reach Justice White's result,
but it will require more discussion than Justice White gave it in
his dissent from denial.

remanded for
ard.

the CAl to evaluate the evidence under that stand-

Because the CAl reversed the TC o~ · "actual malice" grounds,

it expressly declined to consider whether the "wander about the
room" statement was factual and false.
sary

for

the

CAl

to

consider

these

A remand would be necesissues,

and

it could

re-

examine the actual malice finding at that time.

III. CONCLUSION

The CAl decision not to use a clear error standard of review
is supported by language in New York Times.

Nevertheless, fail-

ure to apply Rule 52 in 1st Amendment cases does not make sense,
squanders
holding

judicial

in~ llman

resources,

and

conflicts

with

the

Court's

Standard v. Swint. 5

5 The ACLU has filed an amicus brief, as has a group of 13 big
name publishers and publishing associations. The two briefs add
nothing new to the discussion.

Memorandu~

f/i? 3

--9 {) /2

Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union
Re: Reply Brief

Petr raises an interesting point in its reply brief that is
not raised in its original brief.

In its reply brief, petr
8

concedes that New York Times

authorize~

an independent review of

evidence in 1st Amendment cases, but argues that that independent
review is something less than the de novo review engaged in by
the CAl.

According to petr, New York Times only requires that

the court of appeals, after a careful review of the evidence: 1)
determine whether the facts found by the trial court are
sufficient to support the judgment; and 2)

w~

determine ~there

is

evidence, which, if believed by the trial court, is sufficient as
a matter of law to support the findings of fact.

In support of

this proposition petr cites language in New York Times that the
court of appeals should "review the evidence ••. to determine
whether it could constitutionally support" the judgment and
language in St. Amant v. Thompson, 390

u.s.

727, 731 (1968) that

the appellate court should determine whether there is "sufficient
evidence to permit [a finding of actual malice]."
the words "could" and "permit,"

By keying on

petr maintains that the standard

to be used in 1st Amendment cases is merely a strict application
of the clearly erroneous rule.

The appellate court in this case,

petr maintains, dismissed the trial court's findings of fact

·''

without finding them to be clearly erroneous
and substituted its
' .
own findings after conducting a de novo review of the evidence.
Petrsargument suffers from the same weaknesses that Justice
White's dissent does--it has taken only bits and pieces of the
Court's opinions in New York Times and St. Amant.

When read as a

whole, those opinions are not as narrowly drawn as petr would
have you believe.

See page 9 of my bench memo.

Nevertheless,

petr's interpretation is similar to the one that I have suggested
in footnote 4 of my bench memo and is useful in fleshing out that
thought.

-

~nber

31, 1983
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MEMO TO FILE
See
adequate.

Rob's

bench

article.

of

10/27

that

is

entirely

This is merely to refresh my recollection.

Petitioner makes
publishes

memo

"Consumer

stero~ e

loudspeakers.

Reports"

that

ran

a

Respondent
disparaging

The DC, in a bench trial, found that petitioner

was a "public figure", and therefore that "actual maltce"
must be shown.

The DC concluded that there was "clear and

convincing proof" of such malice, and awarded damages.
CAl, relying on language in New York Times and Time,
Inc. v. Pape, held that the clearly erroneous standard of
Federal

Rule

52(a)

standard

of New York

does
Times

not

apply

where

is applicable.

the

malice

Accordingly,

CAl reviewed the evidence and found no malice.
The

question presented is whether Rule 52 applies to

the pure issue of

fact whether there was actual malice?

There

certainly

is

language

in

New

York

Times

and

Time, Inc. that supports the New York Times requirement of
appellate

review

'V"iullman "s

and

Standard

clarifies NYT.
distinguish

inapplicability
v.

Id. at 287.

"ultimate"

Rule

u.s.

456

Swint,

In Swint we noted

between

of

52.

But

(1982),

273

that Rule 52 does not

and

"subsidiary"

facts.

(we did not address the application of Rule

52 to questions of mixed law and facts) .
Swint
fact"
52

concluded

is at issue,

applies.

that

the

Examples

mentioned in Swint -

whenever

clear~

of

a

question

of

"pure

error requirement of Rule

questions

of

pure

fact

included intent, design, and motive.

Id. at 287.
The issue of malice is a question of one's "state of
mind".

This

is

as much a

question of pure

fact as are

"intent" and "motive".
There
compelling

are

strong

applellate

libel cases.

In

this,

policy
courts
for

to

reasons,
review

example,

the

also,
long
trial

days.
I am inclined to agree that CAl erred.

LFP, JR.

'

.

for

records

not
in
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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 82-1246

BOSE CORPORATION, PETITIONER v. CONSUMERS
UNION OF UNITED STATES, INC.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
[March - , 1984]

JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
An unusual metaphor in a critical review of an unusual
loudspeaker system gave rise to product disparagement litigation that presents us with a procedural question of first impression: Does Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure prescribe the standard to be applied by the Court of
Appeals in its review of a District Court's determination that
a false statement was made with the kind of "actual malice"
described in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254,
279-280 (1964)?
In the May 1970 issue of its ~e, "Consumer Reports," respondent published a seven-p1rge article evaluating
tnequality of numerous brands of medium priced loudspeakers. In a boxed-off section occupying most of two pages, respondent commented on "some loudspeakers of special interest," one of which was the Bose 901-an admittedly "unique
and unconventional" system that had recently been placed on
the market by petitioner.' After describing the system and
some of its virtues, and after noting that a listener "could pinpoint the location of various instruments much more easily
1
In introducing the loudspeaker system to the marketplace, petitioner
emphasized the unconventional nature of the system and actively solicited
reviews in numerous publications thereby inviting critical evaluation and
comment on the unique qualities of the system. 508 F. Supp. 1249, 1273
(D. Mass. 1981).
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with a standard speaker than with the Bose system," respondent's article made the following statements:
"Worse, individual instruments heard through the
Bose system seemed to grow to gigantic proportions and
tended to wander about the room. For instance, a violin appeared to be 10 feet wide and a piano stretched
from wall to wall. With orchestral music, such effects
seemed inconsequential. But we think they might become annoying when listening to soloists." Plaintiff's
Exhibit 2, at 274.
After stating opinions concerning the overall sound quality,
the article concluded: "We think the Bose system is so unusual that a prospective buyer must listen to it judge it for
himself. We would suggest delaying so big an investment
until you were sure the system would please you after the
novelty value had worn off." I d., at 275.
Petitioner took exception to numerous statements made in
the article, and when respondent refused to publish a retraction, petitioner commenced this product disparagement action in the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts. 2 After a protracted period of pretriaLdiscovery, the District Court denied respondent's motion for
Suiilrn.ary judgment, 84 F. R. D. 682 (1980), and conducted a
19-day bench trial on the issue of liability. In its lengthy,
detailed opml'on -on the merits of the case, 508 F. Supp. 1249
Federal jurisdiction over the product disparagement claim was based
on diversity of citizenship, 28 U. S. C. § 1332(a)(1). The law of New York
and Massachusetts, viewed by the parties as in accord in this area, governed the product disparagement claim. 508 F. Supp. , at 1259 n. 17. The
District Court held that under the applicable state law, plaintiff had the
burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the statements in issue were false and disparaging, and also had the burden of
establishing actual damages in order to recover. I d. , at 1259-1260. In addition to the product disparagement claim, petitioner alleged claims for unfair competition and a violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1121.
The District Court held that neither of those claims had been proven. 508
F . Supp., at 1277.
2
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(1981), the District Court ruled in espondent's favor on
most issues. 3 Most significantly, th District Court ruled
that the ~i!:ion~r is a "public figure" s that term is defined
in Gertz v. Robert Wels7i, Inc .', 418 U. S. 323, 342, 345,
351-352 (1974) for purposes of this c se and therefore the
First Amendment, as interpreted in ew York Times v. Sullivan, supra, 376 U. S., at 279-280 precludes recovery in
this product disparagement action unless the petitioner
proved that respondent made a false disparaging statement
with "actual malice."
On th"re~al points, however, the District Court
agreed with petitioner. First, it found that one sentence in
Petitioner's attack on the article included contentions that it was misleading in referring to two persons as a "panel" and in creating the impression that evaluations of loudspeaker quality are objective rather than subjective judgments. While the District Court agreed with petitioner on
these points, it ruled that they did not entitle petitioner to relief. 508 F.
Supp., at 1260-1262. Petitioner also argued that the overall soun.d quality
of the Bose 901 should have been rated higher by the reviewers. The District Court rejected this claim, observing that all of the testimony, including that of Dr. Bose, revealed that the evaluation of a speaker's "sound
quality" or "accuracy" is a "subjective matter," and hence in the final analysis is "nothing more than an opinion and, as such, it cannot be proved to be
true of false." !d., at 1262. The court also found that petitioner had
failed to prove false a statement recommending use of an amplifier of 50
watts per channel to achieve the "deepest" bass response with the speakers, observing that the parties had conceded that the power requirements
of the speakers were readily and objectively ascertainable. !d. , at
1263-1264. The court also found that petitioner had failed to prove that
the person primarily responsible for the article was biased by reason of his
financial interest in eventually marketing a speaker on which he had· obtained a patent. On the other hand, the District Court rejected respondent's argument that there could be no actual malice because respondent
had no motive to distort the facts; the District Court identified two possible
reasons for the disparagement, first, the "scant proof" that respondent had
a "built in bias" against "higher priced products" and second, a suggestion
in the testimony that respondent resorted to "sarcasm" to boost circulation. !d., at 1275-1276. The District Court did not, however, rely upon
these possible motivations as affirmative proof of actual malice. See I d.,
at 127~1277.

~

r

3

/
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D-e~
the article contained a "fa!se" statement of "fact" concerning the tendency of the instruments to wander. 4 Based primarily on testimony by the author of the article, the District
Court found that instruments heard through the speakers
tended to wander "along the wall," rather than "about the
room" as reported by respondent. 5 Second, it found that the
statement was disparaging. Third, it concluded "on the
basis of proof which it considers clear and convincing, that
the plaintiff has sustained its burden of proving that the defendant published a false statement of material fact with
' In its ruling on respondent's motion for summary judgment, the District Court had held that the question whether respondent's panelists "actually heard instruments grow to gigantic proportions or wander about the
room is a question of fact, not opinion.... " 84 F. R. D., at 684. In support of the motion for summary judgment, respondent had submitted an
affidavit by one of the panelists, Arnold Seligson, stating that the article
accurately reported what was heard in the tests and "I know what I
heard," while petitioner had submitted an affidavit by Dr. Bose, who designed the Bose 901, stating in substance that "the phenomenom of widened and wandering instruments ... is a scientific impossibility." Ibid.
5
Although at one point the District Court seemed to suggest that the
instruments, i. e. the sound, did not wander at all, relying on a review in
another publication stating that "each instrument has its prescribed
space-and it stays there." 508 F. Supp., at 1268 (emphasis supplied by
the District Court) (citation omitted), the District Court had previously
stated that some degree of "movement" of sound between loudspeakers is
common to all systems and its discussion of liability indicates that respondent could have truthfully reported that the sound tended to wander "along
the wall," or at least "seemed" to wander along the wall. It is not entirely
clear that the District Court made a finding of fact as such regarding where
the sound tended to wander. Indeed; it is not entirely clear that he found
as a fact that the sound did not wander about the room. Rather, as discussed more extensively infra, at - - , the finding seemed to be that the
"panel" conducting the test did not subjectively perceive the sound to be
wandering "about the room," but rather perceived it to be wandering
"across the room." Just where the sound did "wander," in reality, did not
appear to be the focus of the decision, though there was conflicting testimony concerning whether it was "scientifically impossible" for sound to
wander "about" the room, or to "seem" to wander "about" the room. See
508 F. Supp., at 1267-1269, 1276-1277.

7

'

.

82-124&--0PINION
BOSE CORP. v. CONSUMERS UNION OF U. S., INC.

5

knowledge that it was false@>with reckless disre ard of its
tftith'Oi. falsity." 508 F. Supp., at 1277. 6 Jud ent was
entered for petitioner on the product disparagement claim. 7
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
reversed. 692 F. 2d 189 (1982). The court accepted the finding that the comment about wandering instruments was disparaging. It assumed, without deciding, that the statement
was one of fact, rather than opinion, and that it was false, observing that "stemming at least in part from the uncertain
nature of the statement as one of fact or opinion, it is difficult
to determine with confidence whether it is true or false."
I d., at 194. After noting that petitiongr did not c.ontesUhe
conclusion that it was a public figure, gr the applicability of
the ew or
tmes s andard, the COurt OfA.Ppeals held
that it~ual malice" determination was not
In its ruling on the motion for summary judgment, the District Court
assumed, without deciding, that the actual malice standard would be applicable in the case and expressly recognized that falsity alone does not prove
that statements were made with actual malice, observing that additional
facts are required, and that there must be clear and convincing evidence on
this question. 84 F. R. D., at 684-685. In holding that there was a material issue of "fact" (a label we use advisedly) on actual malice, the District
Court recounted petitioner's argument that the panelists must have known
the statements concerning enlarged and wandering instruments were false
because they were false, ibid. ("[A]ccording to plaintiff, the panel could not
have heard these phenomena and the statement that they did hear them
was false. The plaintiff further contends that because Seligson was a
member of the listening panel . . . he must have known that the statement
was false ... ."). The court also noted petitioner's evidence concerning
Seligison's patent on a speaker system, and indulging in all reasonable inferences favorable to the plaintiff, concluded that a genuine issue of material fact existed on the question of actual malice. I d., at 686.
7
A separate trial before a different judge on the issue of damages resulted in a finding that the false disparaging statement resulted in a sales
loss of 824 units, each of which would have produced a net profit of $129,
causing petitioner damages of $106,296. Petitioner also was awarded
$9,000 for expenses incurred in an attempt to mitigate damages. Judgment for the total amount, plus interest, was entered by the District
Court. 529 F. Supp. 357 (1981).
6

I
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stand~··;.,:r.;:

fi7'

b~

"limited" to the clearly erroneous
in..__
stead, it stated that it "must perform a((ie novo ~~~e- C /l J - ~
pendently examining the record to en'sure-trratthedistrict ~
court has applied properly the governing constitutional law
and that the plaintiff has indeed satisfied its burden of proof." b
~
I d., at 195. It added, however, that it "was in no position to
consider the credibility of witnesses and must leave such
questions of demeanor to the trier of fact." Ibid. Based on
its own review of the record, the Court of Appeals concluded:
~

'I

,~

"[W]e are unable to find clear and convincing evidence
that CU published the statement that indiviclllarinstruments tended to wander about the room with knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it
was false or not. The evidence presented merely shows
that the words in the article may not have described precisely what the two panelists heard during the listening
test. CU was ~ilty of using imprecise Ian age in the
article-perhaps resultmg from an attempt to produce a
readable article for its' mass audience. Certainly this
does not support an inference of actual malice." I d., at
197.
We granted certiorari to consider whether the Court of
Appeals erred when it refused to apply the clearly erroneous
standard of Rule 52(a) to the District Court's "finding" of actual malice. - - U. S. - - (1983).
I

To place the issue in focus, it is necessary to state in somewhat greater detail (a) the evidence on the "actual malice"
issue; and (b) the basis for the District Court's determination.
8
Judge Campbell concurred specially to emphasize the fact that the
Court of Appeals had not passed on the merits of the District Court's holding that petitioner was a public figure. We, of course, also do not pass on
that question.

C:ll

/>--·-1 .. ..11.-.a
<..--V~

'

.
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Evidence of Actual Malice.
At trial petitioners endeavored to prove that the key sentence embodied three distinct falsehoods about instruments
heard through the Bose system: (1) that their size seemed
grossly enlarged; (2) that they seemed to move; and (3) that
their movement was "about the room."
Although a great deal of the evidence concerned the first
two points, the District Court found that neither was false.
It concluded that the average reader would understand that
the reference to enlarged instruments was intended to describe the size of the area from which the sound seemed to
emanate rather than to any perception about the actual size
of the musical instruments being played, rejecting as "absurd" the notion that readers would interpret the figurative
language literally. 508 F. Supp., at 1266. 9 After referring to
testimony explaining "that a certain degree of movement of
the apparent sound source is to be expected with all stereo
loudspeaker systems," the District Court recognized that the
statement was accurate insofar as it reported that "instruments ... tended to wander.... " Id., at 1267. Thus, neither the reference to the apparent size of the instruments,
nor the reference to the fact that instruments appeared to
move, was false. 10
The statement that instruments tended to wander "about
the room" was found false because what the listeners in the
test actually perceived was an apparent movement back and
forth along the wall in front of them and between the two
"Therefore, the plaintiff did not present any evidence to contradict the
defendant's evidence which tended to show that when listening to the Bose
901 a listener could and does perceive that the apparent sound source is
very large. Thus, the court concludes that the plaintiff has not sustained
its burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's
statement-'instruments . .. seemed to grow to gigantic proportions'was false." 508 F. Supp., at 1267.
0
' Thus, respondent prevailed on both of the issues of fact that had been
identified at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings. See n. 4,
9

supra.
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speakers. Because an apparent movement "about the
room"-rather than back and forth-would be so different
from what the average listener has learned to expect, the
District Court concluded "that the location of the movement
of the apparent sound source is just as critical to a reader as
the fact that movement occurred." Ibid.
The evidence concerning respondent's knowledge of this
falsity focused on Arnold Seligson, an engineer employed by
respondent. Seligson supervised the test of the Bose 901
and prepared the written report upon which the published article was based. His initial in-house report contained this
sentence: "'Instruments not only could not be placed with
precision but appeared to suffer from giganticism and a tendency to wander around the room; a violin seemed about 10 ft.
wide, a piano stretched from wall to wall, etc.'" I d., at 1264,
n. 28. Since the editorial revision from "around the room" to
"about' the room" did not change the meaning of the false
statement, and since there was no evidence that the editors
were aware of the inaccuracy in the original report, the actual malice determination rests entirely on an evaluation of
Seligson's state of mind when he wrote his initial report, or
when he checked the article against that report.
Seligson was deposed before trial and testified for almost
s~day~l itself. At one point in his directexaminatiOil,he respondeaatfength to technical testimony by Dr.
Bose, explaining the scientific explanation for the apparent
' movement of the source of sound back and forth across a wall.
Joint App. 117-122. The trial judge then questioned
Seligson, and that questioning revealed that the movement
which Seligson had heard during the tests was confined to the
wall. 11 During his cross-examination, at counsel's request he
The following questions were asked and answered:
"Q. Does that explain, in your opinion, the lateral movement of the
instrument?
"A. Yes.
11

I I
...

'

.
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drew a rough sketch of the movement of the sound source
that he intended to describe with the words "tended to wander about the room"; that sketch revealed a back and forth
movement along the wall between the speakers. He was
then asked:
"Q. Mr. Seligson, why did you use the words 'tended
to wander about the room' to describe what you have
drawn on the board?
"A. Well, I don't know what made me pick that particular choice of words. Would you have been more satisfied if we said 'across,'-! think not-instead of before.
I have the feeling you would have objected in either
event. The word 'about' meant just as I drew it on the
board. Now, I so testified in my deposition"-Joint
App. 169. 12
"Q. I think your statement in the article which says they moved into the
room, just as if they came forward, as well"A. The example given for the movement into the room refers only to a
widened violin and a widened piano and was meant to imply only that the
widening and movement was across the rear wall from the two speakers.
"Q. 'It tended to wander about the room.' It didn't say from side to
side or against the walls alone, but it says"A. I believe the next sentence is meant to explain that. It then says,
'For instance,' as an example of the effect.
"Q. The word 'about' means around, doesn't it?
"A. It was, your Honor, it was meant to mean about the rear wall, between the speakers.
"Q. That isn't what it says, though.
"A. I understand."
Joint App. 122-124
12
These additional questions were then asked and answered:
"Q. Would it have been more accurate in your judgment to say that the
instruments tended to move back and forth between the two speakers?
"A. No, I don't think so, taken in context of the way it's described. Remember, the effect is carefully described in a few sentences later. It's
hard to mistake.
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The District Court's Actual Malice Determination.
The District Court's reasons for fin mg a sity in the description of the location of the movement of the wandering instruments provided the background for its ruling on actual
malice. The court concluded that "no reasonable reader"
would understand the sentence as describing lateral movement along the wall. Because the "average reader" would
interpret the word "about" according to its "plain ordinary
meaning," the District Court unequivocally rejected
Seligson's testimony-and respondent's argument-that the
sentence, when read in context, could be understood to refer
to lateral movement. 13
On similar reasoning the District Court found Seligson's
above-quoted explanation of the intended meaning of the sentence incredible. The District Court reasoned:
"Thus, according to Seligson, the words used in the
Article--'About the room'-mean something different to
him than they do to the populace in general. If Seligson
"Q. Is there anything in the article which you think conveys to the
reader the idea that the instruments stayed down at one end of the room
and didn't come out and wander about, like you wandered about, where
you have drawn the orange line?
"A. Yes.
"Q. What is that?
"A. I would think that the reader would get that from reading that a
violin appeared to be ten feet wide and a piano stretched from wall to wall.
This is no hint of depth or whatever, entering into the room." Joint App.
16~170.

" The District Court buttressed this conclusion by pointing out that petitioner had received no complaints from purchasers about any wandering
instruments, and that no other reviews of the Bose 901 had referred to
wandering instruments. On the contrary, a review quoted by the District
Court commented that "each instrument has its prescribed space-and it
stays there." Seen. 5, supra. This evidence, however, was more probative of falsity in ascribing any movement at all to the sound source than of
falsity in describing the location of the movement. As we have pointed
out, the District Court found that the article was truthful insofar as it
stated that apparent movement occured.

'

'
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is to be believed, at the time of publication of the Article
he interpreted, and he still interprets today, the words
'about the room' to mean 'along the wall.' After careful
consideration of Seligson's testimony and of his demeanor at trial, the Court finds that Seligson's testimony
on this point is not credible. Seligson is an intelligent
person whose knowledge of the English language cannot
be questioned. It is simply impossible for the Court to
believe that he interprets a commonplace word such as
'about' to mean anything other than its plain ordinary
meaning.
"Based on the above finding that Seligson's testimony
to the contrary is not credible, the Court further finds
that at the time of the Article's publication Seligson
knew that the words 'individual instruments . . . tended
to wander about the room' did not accurately describe
the effects that he and Lefkow had heard during the
'special listening test.' Consequently, the Court concludes, on the basis of proof which it considers clear and
convincing, that the plaintiff has sustained its burden of
proving that the defendant published a false statement of
material fact with the knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of its truth or falsity." 508 F. Supp.,
at 127~1277.
Notably, the District Court's ultimate determination of actual malice was framed as a conclusion and was stated in the
disjunctive. Even though the District Court found it impossible to believe that Seligson-at the time of trial-was
truthfully maintaining that the words "about the room" could
fairly be read, in context, to describe lateral movement
rather than irregular movement throughout the room, the
District Court did not identify any independent evidence that
Seligffianrealized the inaccuracYQr the statement, o; entertained serious doubts about its truthfulness, at the time of

----------------------------
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publication. 14

II

This is a case in which two well settled and respected rules
of law point in oppo~ite directions.
Petl 10ner correct y remm s us that Rule 52(a) provides: ~
"Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly er- ~
roneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportutritYQr the trial court to judge of the credibility of the
witnesses."
We have repeatedly held that the rule means what it says.
Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. lves Laboratories, Inc., 456
U. S. 844, 855-856 (1982); Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456
U. S. 273, 287 (1982); United States v. United States Gypsum
Co., 333 U. S. 364, 394-396 (1948). It surely does not
stretch the language of the rule to characterize an inquiry
into what a person knew at a given point in time as a question
of "fact." 15 In this case, since the trial judge expressly commented on Seligson's credibility, petitioner argues that the
Court of Appeals plainly erred when it refused to uphold the
District Court's actual malice "finding" under the clearly erroneous standard of Rule 52(a).
On the other hand, respondent correctl~nds us that in
cases raising First Amendment issues we have repeatedly
held that anappellate courtlias anob!ii2 atfon to ''make an indepen en exammation of the w
record' in order to make
sure "t hat the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression." New York Times v.
Sullivan, supra, 376 U. S., at 284-286. See also i::rAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware, 458 U. S. 886, 933-934 (1983); Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Assn. v. Bressler, 398 U. S. 6,
14
The District Court expressly rejected petitioner's exhaustive attempt
to prove that Seligson had a continuing interest in marketing his own
speaker and therefore deliberately distorted the review. 508 F. Supp., at
1275.
16
lndeed, in Herbert v. Lando, 441 U. S. 153, 170 (1979) we referred in
passing to actual malice as "ultimate fact."
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11 (1970); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U. S. 727, 732-733
(1968). Although such statements have been made most frequently in cases to which Rule 52(a) does not apply because
they arose in state courts, respondent argues that the constitutional principle is equally app ca e to e era Itlga 10n.
We qw e agree; sure y · wou
ervert t e concept of federalism for trus Court to lay claim to a broader power of review
over state court judgments than it exercises in reviewing the
judgments of intermediate federal courts.
Our standard of review must be faithful to both Rule 52(a)
and t e ru e o m epen en review app Ied1n New York
e con ct etween the two rules is in
Times v. ul wan.
some respects more apparent than real. The New York
Times rule emphasizes the need for an appellate court to
make an independent examination of the entire record; Rule
52(a) never forbids such an examination, and indeed our seminal decision on the rule expressly contemplated a review of
the entire record, stating that a "finding is 'clearly erroneous'
when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing
court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed." United
States v. Gypsum Co., supra, 333 U. S., at 395 (emphasis
supplied). Moreover, Rule 52(a) commands that "due regard" shall be given to the trial judge's opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses; the constitutionallybased rule of indepenaent reVie~rmits this oppo?€umty to
beg we n its due. Indeed, as we previously observed, the
Court of Appeals in this case expressly declined to secondguess the district judge on the credibility of the witnesses.
The requirement that special deference be given to a trial
judge's ~r~ihilitLde~1olliis Itself a recogcltion of the
broader proposition that the presumption of correctness that
attaches to factual findings is stronger in some cases.....th,an in
o~s. The same "clearly erroneous"~dard applies to
findings based on d~umen~de~e as to those based entirely on oral testiriiOri'y,See Uiiitea States Gypsum Co.,

~ 0"2~

~

~ ~z:h:.
~--~
~!

?7
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supra, 333 U. S., at 394, but the presum lion has lesser force
in the former situation than m the latter.
mn arly, the
st~~trfal becomes longer and
more complex, but the likelihood that the appellate court will \
rely on the presumption tends to increase when trial judges
have lived with the controversy for weeks or months instead
of just a few hours. 16 One might therefore assume that the
cases in which the appellate courts have a duty to exercise
independent review are merely those in which the presumption that the trial court's ruling is correct is particularly
weak. The difference between the two rules, however, is
much more tl.:!.an a mere matter of deS!ee. For the ruleof
ind~ review assigns to judges a constitutional responsibility that cannot be delegated to the trier of fact, whether
the factfinding function be performed in the particular case
by a jury or by a trial judge.
Rule 52(a) applies to findings of fact, including those described as "ultimate facts" because they may determine the
outcome of litigation. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint,
supra, 456 U. S., at 287. But Rule 52(a) does not inhibit an
appellate court's power to correct errors of law, including
6

"The conclusiveness of a .'finding of fact' depends on the nature of the
materials on which ·the finding is based. The finding even of a so-called
'subsidiary fact' may be a more or less difficult process varying according to
the simplicity or sublety of the type of 'fact' in controversy. Finding socalled ultimate 'facts' more clearly implies the application of standards of
law. And so the 'finding of fact' even if made by two courts may go beyond
the determination that should not be set aside here. Though labeled 'finding of fact,' it may involve the very basis on which judgment of fallible evidence is to be made. Thus, the conclusion that may appropriately be
drawn from the whole mass of evidence is not always the ascertainment of
the kind of 'fact' that precludes consideration by this Court. See, e. g.,
Beyer v. LeFevre, 186 U. S. 114. Particularly is this so where a decision
here for review cannot escape broadly social judgments-judgments lying
close to opinion regarding the whole nature of our Government and the duties and immunities of citizenship." Baumgartner v. United States, 322
U. S. 665, 670-671 (1944). See generally Pullman-Standard v. Swint,
supra, 456 U. S., at 28~287 n. 16.
'
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those that may infect a so-called mixed finding of law and
fact, or a finding of fact that is predicated on a misunderstanding of the governing rule of law. See ibid.; Inwood
Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., supra, 456
U. S., at 855 n. 15. Nor does Rule 52(a) "furnish particular
guidance with respect to distinguishing law from fact."
Pullman Standard v. Swint, supra, 456 U. S., at 288.
What we have characterized as "the vexing nature" of that
distinction, ibid., does not, however, diminish its importance,
or the importance of the principles that require the distinction to be drawn in certain cases. 17
In a consideration of the possible application of the distinction to the issue of "actual malice" at least three characteristics of the rule enunciated in the New York Times case are
relevant. First, the common law heritage of the rule itself
assigns an especially broad role to the judge in a lying it to
econ , t e content of the ru e is
specific factua s1 ua 10 s.
no~ by its literal text, but rather is given
meaning through the evolutionary process of common law ad- 7
judication; though the source of the rule is found in the con- "
stitution, it is nevertheless largely a judge-made rule of law.
Finally, the constitutional values protected by the rule make
it imperative that judges-and in some cases judges of this
Court-make sure that it is correctly applied. A few words /_/~L;~~~~_,
about each of these aspects of the rule are appropriate.
~-- ---------1
The federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood unless he proves
17
A finding of fact in some cases is inseparable from the principles
through which it was deduced. At some point, the reasoning by which a
fact is "found" crosses the line between application of those ordinary principles of logic and common experience which are ordinarily entrusted to the
finder of fact into the realm of a legal rule upon which the reviewing court
must exercise its own independent judgment. Where the line is drawn
varies according to the nature of the substantive law at issue. Regarding
certain largely factual questions in some areas of the law, the stakes-in
terms of impact on future cases and future conduct-are too great to entrust them finally to the judgment of the trier of fact.

,J
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that the false "statement was made with 'actual malice'-that \
is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard ·of whe1ner 1 was a se or no , ew or tmes, supra,
376 lf. . , a 279= , as 1 s counterpart in rules previously
adopted by a number of state courts and extensively reviewed by scholars for generations. 18 The earlier defamation
cases, in turn, have a kinship to English cases considering the
kind of motivation that must be proved to support a common
law action for deceit. 19 It has long been recognized that the
formulation of a rule of this kind "allows the judge the maximum of power in passing judgment in the particular case." 20
Moreover, the exercise of this power is the process through
which the rule itself evolves and its integrity is maintained. 21
As we have explained, the meaning of some concepts cannot
be adequately expressed in a simple statement:
18

A representative list of such cases and comments is found in footnote
20 of the Court's opinion in New York Times, supra, 376 U. S., at 280.
19
Under what has been characterized as the "honest liar" formula, fraud
could be proved "when it is shown that a false representation has been
made (1) knowinging, or (2) without belief in its truth, or (3) recklessly,
careless whetherrrbe true or false." Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337, 374
(1889).
20
"Probably the formula is less definite than it seems. Its limitations
are perhaps largely a matter of language color. As do most English formulas, it allows the judge the maximum of power in passing judgment in
the particular case. It restricts the jury as neatly as can be done to the
function of evaluating the evidence. But judgment under this formula can
be turned either way with equal facility on any close case." L. Green,
Judge and Jury, 286 (1930) (Chapter 10 of this work by Professor Green,
cited herein, is also published in 16 Va. L. Rev. 749 (1930)).
21
"And it must be kept in mind that the judge has another distinct function in dealing with these elements, which though not frequently called into
play, is of the utmost importance. It involves the determination of the
scope of the general formula, or some one of its elements. It comes into
play in marginal cases. It requires the judge to say what sort of conduct ,
can be considered as condemned under the rules which are employed in
such cases. It is the function through which the formulas and rules themselves were evolved, through which their integrity is maintained and their
availability determined." L. Green, Judge and Jury, 304 (1930).
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"These considerations fall short of proving St. Amant's
reckless disregard for the accuracy of his statements
about Thompson. 'Reckless disregard,' it is true, cannot be fully encompassed in one infallible definition. Inevitably its outer li~ts will be marked out through caseby-case adjudication, as is true with so many legal
standards for judging concrete cases, whether the standard is provided by the Constitution, statutes, or case
law. Our cases, however, have furnished :rn.eani~l
guidance for the further definition of a reckless publication." St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U. S. 727, 730-731

,.
~

(1968).

l

When the standard governing the decision of a particular
case is provided by the Constitution, this Court's role in
marking out the limits of the standard through the process of
case-by-case adjudication is of special importance. This
process has been vitally important in cases involving restrictions on the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment, particularly in those cases in which it is contended that
the communication in issue is within one of the few classes of
"unprotected" speech.Yt The First Amendment presupposes
that the freedom to speak one's mind is not only an aspect of
individual liberty-and thus a good unto itself-but also is essential to the common quest for truth and the vitality of society as a whole. Under our Constitution "there is no such
thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may
seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of
judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas."
~ v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra, 418 U. S., at 339--340
(footnote omitted). Nevertheless, there are categories of
communcation and certain special utterences to which the
majestic.Eot_g,ctiQn of the First Amendment does not extend
oecause they "are no essential part of any exposition of ideas,
and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed

J
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by the social interest in order and morality." Chaplinsky v.
New Hamphire, 315 U. S. 568, 572 (1942).
Lib~~s speech has been held to constitute one such category, see Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U. S. 250 (1952); others that have been held to be outside the scope of the freedom
of speech are fighting:JY~ords, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U. S. 568 (1942), incitement to riot, Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U. S. 444 (1969), obscenity, Roth v. United States,
354 U. S. 476 (1957), and chlidPornography, New York v.
Ferber, 458 U. S. 747 (1982).~ In each of these areas, the
limits of the unprotected category, as well as the unprotected
character of particular communications, has been determined
by the judicial evaluation of special facts that have been
deemed to have constitutional significance. In such cases,
the Court has regularly conducted an inde endent review of
the recor both to e sure a t e speech in ques 10n ac ually
fallsWitfiin the unprotected category and to confine the perimeters of any unprotected category within acceptably nar22

Commercial speech was once regarded as unprotected by the First
Amendment, see Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U. S. 52 (1942), but in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U. S.
748 (1976), we rejected that broad conclusion. Though false and misleading commercial speech could be deemed to represent a category of unprotected speech, see ibid., the rationale for doing so would be essentially the
same as that involved in the libel area, viz. "[T]here is no constitutional
va~t. " Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S.,
at 340. Moreover, since a commercial advertiser usually "seeks to disseminate information about a specific prduct or service he himself provides and
presumably knows more about than anyone else," Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumer Council, supra, 425 U. S., at 772 n. 24,
there is a mininal "danger that governmental regulation of false or misleading price or product advertising will chill accurate and nondeceptive commercial expression." Id. , at 777 (Stewart, J. concurring).
Statements made by public employees in their employment capacity and
not touching on matters of public concern may be considered unprotected
in the sense that employment-related sanctions may be imposed on the
basis of such statements. See Connick v. Myers,-- U. S. - - (1983);
Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated Schood District, 439 U. S. 410
(1979); Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 563 (1968).
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row limits in an effort to ensure that protected expression
will not be inhibited. Providing triers of fact with a general
description of the type of communication whose content is unworthy of protection has not, in and of itself, served sufficiently to narrow the category, nor served to eliminate the
danger that decisions by triers of fact may inhibit the expression of protected ideas. 23 The principle of viewpoint neutrality that underlies the First Amendment itself, see Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92, 9fr.96 (1972),
also imposes a special responsibility on judges whenever it is
claimed that a particular communciation is unprotected. See
generally, Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1, 4 (1949).
We have exercised independent judgment on the question
whether particular remarks "were so inherently inflammatory as to come within that small class of 'fighting words'
which are 'likely to provoke the average person to retaliation,
and thereby cause a breach of the peace,"' Street v. New
York, 394 U. S. 576, 592 (1969), and on the analogous question whether advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action, Hess v. Indiana, 414 U. S. 105,
108-109 (1973) (per curiam); compare id., at 111 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting) ("The simple explanation for the result
in this case is that the majority has interpreted the evidence
differently from the courts below."); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229 (1963) (recognizing duty "to make an independent examination of the whole record."); Pennekamp v.
Florida, 328 U. S. 331, 335 (1946) ("[W]e are compelled to examine for ourselves the statements in issue to see whether or
not they do carry a threat of clear and present danger . . . or
23
The risk of broadening a category of unprotected speech may explain
why one Member of this Court preferred a candid statement-"! know it
when I see it,"-of his concept of the judicial function to a premature attempt to fashion an all encompassing "shorthand description" of obscenity.
See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U. S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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whether they are of a character which the principles of the
First Amendment ... protect."). 24
Similarly, although under Miller v. California, 413 U. S.
15 (1973), the questions of what appeals to "prurient interest"
and what is "patently offensive" under the community standard obscenity test are "essentially questions of fact," id., at
30, we expressly recognized the "ultimate power of appellate courts to conduct an independent review of constitutional
claims when necessary," id., at 25. 25 We have therefore re24
See also Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U. S. 380, 385--387 (1927) (explaining
that this Court will review findings of fact by a State court where a federal
right has been denied on the basis of a fact without evidence to support it
and where a conclusion of law as to a federal right and a finding of fact are
so intermingled to require analysis of the facts); Gitlow v. New York, 268
U. S. 652, 665-666 (1925); see also Schaefer v. United States, 251 U. S.
466, 483 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see generally Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601, 613--614 (1973) (explaining Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229 (1963); Cox v. Louisinana, 372 U. S. 536 (1963); and
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 311 (1940)).
25
In support of this statement, we cited Justice Harlan's opinion in Roth
v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 497-498 (1957), where he observed:
"The Court seems to assume that 'obscenity' is a peculiar genus of 'speech
and press,' which is as distinct, recognizable, and classifiable as poison ivy
is among other plants. On this basis the constitutional question before us
simply becomes whether 'obscenity,' as an abstraction, is protected by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments, and the question whether a particular
book may be suppressed becomes a mere matter of classification, of 'fact,'
to be entrusted to a factfinder and insulated from independent constitutional judgment. But surely the problem cannot be solved in such a generalized fashion. Every communication has an individuality and 'value' of
its own. The suppression of a particular writing or other tangible form of
expression is, therefore, an individual matter, and in the nature of things
every such suppression raises an individual constitutional problem, in
which a reviewing court must determine for itself whether the attacked expression is suppressable within constitutional standards. Since those
standards do not readily lend themselves to generalized definitions, the
constitutional problem in the last analysis becomes one of particularized
judgments which appellate courts must make for themselves.
I do not think that reviewing courts can escape this responsibility by saying that the trier of facts, be it a jury or a judge, has labeled the questioned
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jected the contention that a jury finding of obscenity vel non
is insulated from review so long as the jury was properly instructed and there is some evidence to support its findings,
holding that substantive constitutional limitations govern.
In Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U. S. 153, 159-161 (1974), based
on an independent examination of the evidence-the exhibition of a motion picture-the Court held that the film in
question "could not, as a matter of constitutional law, be
found to depict sexual conduct in a patently offensive
way.... "Id., at 161. 26 And in its recent opinion identifying
a new category of unprotected expression-child pornography-the Court expressly anticipated that an "independent
examination" of the allegedly unprotected material may be
necessary "to assure ourselves that the judgment ... 'does
not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression."' New York v. Ferber, supra, 458 U. S., at 774 n.
28 (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, supra, 376 U. S.,
at 285).
Hence, in New York Times v. Sullivan, after announcing
the constitutional requirement for a finding of "actual malice"
in certain types of defamation actions, it was only natural
that we should conduct an independent review of the evidence on the dispositive constitutional issue. We explained
our action as follows:
matter as 'obscene,' for, if 'obscenity' is to be suppressed, the question
whether a particular work is of that character involves not really an issue
of fact but a question of constitutional judgment of the most sensitive and
delicate kind."
26
Compare Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S. 87, 100, 124 (1974)
(holding that jury determination of obscenity was supported by the evidence and consistent with the applicable constitutional standard while reviewing petitioner's sufficiency of the evidence arguments regarding other
issues under the test of Glasser v. United States, 418 U. S. 124 (1942)). See
generally Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U. S. 184, 187-190 (opinion of
BRENNAN, J.) (de novo review required in obscenity cases); id., at 202-203
(Warren, C. J., dissenting) (intermediate standard of review).
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"This Court's duty is not limited to the elaboration of
constitutional principles; we must also in proper cases review the evidence to make certain that those principles
have been constitutionally applied. This is such a case,
particularly since the question is one of alleged trespass
across 'the line between speech unconditionally guaranteed and speech which may legitimately be regulated.'
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 525. In cases where
that line must be drawn, the rule is that we 'examine for
ourselves the statements in issue and the circumstances
under which they were made to see . . . whether they
are of a character which the principles of the First
Amendment, as adopted by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, protect.' Pennekamp v.
Florida, 328 U. S. 331, 335; see also One, Inc. v. Olesen,
355 U. S. 371; Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355
U. S. 372. We must 'make an independent examination
of the whole record,' Edwards v. South Carolina, 372
U. S. 229, 235, so as to assure ourselves that the judgment does not constitute a forbidden instrusion on the
field of free expression." New York Times v. Sullivan,
supra, 376 U. S., at 285 (footnote omitted). 27
This Court "has an 'obligation to test challenged judgments against the
guarantees of the First and Fourteenth Amendments,' and in doing so 'this
Court cannot avoid making an independent constitutional judgment on the
facts of the case.' Jacabellis v. Ohio 378 U. S. 184, 190 (1964) [opinion of
BRENNAN, J.]. The simple fact is that First Amendment questions of
'constitutional fact' compel this Court's de novo review. See Edwards v.
South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229, 235 (1963); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361
U. S. 199, 205 n. 5 (1960).'' Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U. S. 29, 54
(1971) (opinion of BRENNAN, J ., joined by BURGER, C. J ., and
BLACKMUN, J.)
In New York Times v. Sullivan, we were reviewing a state court judgment entered on a jury verdict. Respondent had contended that the Seventh Amendment precluded an independent review. Recognizing that the
Seventh Amendment's ban on re-examination of facts tried by a jury applied to a case coming from the state courts, Chicago , Burlington and
Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 243-246 (1897); The Justices v.
27
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In Ti~c. v. Pape, 401 U. S. 279 (1971), a case in which
the federal District Court had entered a directed verdict, we
again conducted an independent examination of the evidence
on the question of actual malice, labeling our definition of "actual malice" as a "constitutional rule" and stating that the
question before us was whether that rule had been correctly
applied to the facts of the case, id., at 284. Again we stated
that independent inquiries "of this kind are familiar under the
settled principle that '[i]n cases in which there is a claim of
denial of rights under the Federal Constitution, this Court is
not bound by the conclusions of lower courts, but will re-examine the evidentiary basis on which those conclusions are
founded,'" noting that "in cases involving the area of tension
between the First and Fourteenth Amendments on the one
hand and state defamation laws on the other, we have frequently had occasion to review 'the evidence in the . . .
record to determine whether it could constitutionally support
a judgment' for the plaintiff." Ibid. (citations omitted) 28
In Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U. S. 265, 277 (1971)
the Court held "as a matter of constitutional law" that the
jury could not be allowed to determine the relevance of a
defamatory statement to the plaintiff's status as a public figure. We explained that the jury's application of such a
standard "is unlikely to be neutral with respect to the content
Murray, 9 Wall. 274 (1869); see generally Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 431
(1830), we found the argument without merit, relying on our statement in
Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U. S. 380, 385--386 (1927) that review of findings of
fact is appropriate "where a conclusion of law as to a Federal right and a
finding of fact are so intermingled as to make it necessary, in order to pass
upon the Federal question, to analyze the facts."
28
Justice Harlan, the lone dissenter in Time, Inc . v. Pape , observed that
the Court had merely refound the facts in the case, but agreed that the
Court was free to examine for itself the evidentiary bases upon which the
decision below rested. He argued that this power need not be exercised in
every case, but rather independent review of the evidence should be limited to cases in which certain "unusual factors" exist, such as "allegations of
harrassment." 401 U. S., at 294.
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of speech and holds a real danger of becoming an instrument
for the suppression of those 'vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks,' New York Times, supra,
at 270, which must be protected if the guarantees of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments are to prevail." Ibid. 29
The requirement of independent appellate review reiterated in New York Times v. Sullivan is a rule of federal constitutional law. It emerged from the exigency of deciding
concrete cases; it is law in its purest form under our common
law heritage. It reflects a deeply held conviction that
judges-and particularly members of this Court-must exercise such review in order to preserve the precious liberties
established and ordained by the Constitution. The question
whether the evidence in the record in a defamation case is of
the convincing clarity required to strip the utterance of First
Amendment protection is not merely a question for the trier
of fact. Judges, as expositors of the Constitution, must independently decide whether the evidence in the record is sufficient to cross the constitutional threshold that bars the entry of any judgment that is not supported by clear and
convincing proof of "actual malice."
III
The Court of Appeals was correct in its conclusions (1) that
there is a significant difference between proof of actual malice 30 and mere proof Oirarsity, and (2) that such add1honal
proof is lacking m tlhs case.
A similar concern with the need to "preserve the right of free speech
both from suppression by tyrannous, well-meaning majorities and from
abuse by irresponsible, fanatical minorities," Schaefer v. United States,
251 U. S. , at 482 (1920) (dissenting opinion) was identified by Justice Brandeis in explaining the special risk in allowing jurors to evaluate the character of the "clear and present danger" presented by arguably seditious
speech.
30
The burden of proving "actual malice" requires the plaintiff to demonstrate with clear and convincing evidence that the defendant realized that
his statement was false or that he subjectively entertained serious doubt as
to the truth of his statement. See, e. g. , New York Times v. Sullivan,
29

I
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The factual portion of the District Court's opinion may
fairly be read as including the following findings: (1)
Seligson's actual perception of the apparent movement of the
sound source at the time the Bose 901 was tested was "along
the wall" rather than "about the room"; (2) even when the
words in the disputed sentence are read in the context of the
entire article, neither the "average reader," nor any other
intelligent person, would interpret the word "about" to mean
"across"; (3) Seligson is an intelligent, well educated person;
(4) the words "about the room" have the same meaning for
Seligson as they do for the populace in general; and (5) although he was otherwise a credible witness, Seligson's testimony that (a) he did not "know what made me pick that particular choice of words" and (b) that the word "about" meant
what he had drawn on the board, is not credible.
When the testimony of a witness is not believed, the trier
of fact may simply disregard it. Normally the discredited
testimony is not considered ~ficient basis for drawing a
contrary conclusion. See Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co., 340 U. S. 573, 575 (1951). In this case the trial
judge found it impossible to believe that Seligson continued
to maintain that the word "about" meant "across."
Seligson's testimony does not rebut any inference of actual
malice that the record otherwise supports, but it is equally
clear that it does not constitute clear and convincing evidence
of actual malice. Seligson displayed a capacity for rationalization. He had made a mistake and when confronted
with it, he refused to admit it and steadfastly attempted to
maintain that no mistake had been made-that the inaccurate
was accurate. That attempt failed, but the fact that he made
the attempt does not establish that he realized the
innaccuracy at the time of publication.
supra, 376 U. S., at 280; see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, supra, 418 U. S.,
at 342; St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U. S. 727, 731 (1968); see generally
W. Prosser, Handbook on the Law of Torts 771-772, 821 (4th ed. 1971).
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Aside from Seligson's vain attempt to defend his statement
as a precise description of the nature of the sound movement,
the only evidence of actual malice on which the District Court
relied" was Enefuct tliat the sfatement was an inaccurate description whaf"Sel}gsonhad actually erceived. Seligson
of course ha msis ed "I know what I heard." The trial
court took him at his word, and reasoned that since he did
know what he had heard, and he knew that the meaning of
the language employed did not accurately reflect what he
heard, he must have realized the statement was inaccurate at
the time he wrote it. "Analysis of this kind may be adequate
when the alleged libel purports to be an eyewitness or other
direct account of events that speak for themselves." Time,
Inc. v. Pape, supra, 401 U. S., at 279. Here, however,
adoption of the language chosen was "one of a number of possible rational interpretations" of an event "that bristled with
ambiquities" and descriptive challenges for the writer. Id.,
at 290. The choice of such language, though reflecting a misconception, does not place the speech beyond the outer limits
of the First Amendment's broad protective umbrella.
Under the District Court's analysis, any individual using a
malapropism might be liable, simply because an intelligent
speaker would have to know that the term was inaccurate in
context, even though he did not realize his folly at the time.
The statement in this case represents the sort of inaccuracy that is commonplace in the forum of robust debate to
which the New York Times rule a~"Re
alistically, . . . some error is inevitable; and the difficulties of
separating fact from fiction convinced the Court in New York
Times, Butts, Gertz, and similiar cases to limit liability to instances where some degree of culpability is present in order
to eliminate the risk of undue self-censorship and the suppression of truthful material." Herbert v. Lando, 441 U. S.
153, 171-172 (1979). "[E]rroneous statement is inevitable in
free debate, and . . . must be protected if the freedoms of eXpre~o have the 'breathing space' that they '!leed . . .

of
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to survive.'" New York Times v. Sullivan, supra, 376
U. S., at 271-272 (citation omitted).
The Court of Appeals entertained some doubt concerning
the ruling that the New York Times rule should be applied to
a claim of product disparagement based on a critical review of
a loudspeaker system. We express no view on that ruling,
but having accepted it for purposes of deciding this case, we
agree with the Court of Appeals that the difference between
hearing violin sounds move around the room and hearing
them wander back and forth fits easily within the breathing
space that gives life to the First Amendment. We may accept all of the purely factual findings of the District Court and
nevertheless hold as a matter of law that the record does not
contain clear and convincing evidence that Seligson or his employer prepared the loudspeaker article with knowledge that
it contained a false statement, or with reckless disregard of
the truth.
It may well be that in this case, the "finding" of the District
Court on the actual malice question could have been set aside
under the clearly erroneous standard of review, and we share
the concern of the Court of Appeals that the statements at
issue tread the line between fact and opinion. Moreover, the
analYsis oftlleCentral legal quesbon before us may seem out
of place in a case involving a dispute about the sound quality
of a loudspeaker. But though the question presented
reaches us on a somewhat peculiar wavelength, we reaffirm \
the principle of independent appellate review t at we ave
applied uncounted times Before. We hold thaftfie clearfy erroneouSStandar<l of Rule "52(a) of 1he Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure does not prescribe the standard of review to be applied in reviewing a determination of actual malice in a case
governed by New York Times v. Sullivan. Appellate judges
in such a case must exercise in ependent judgment and~
de
termine whether the record establishes actual malice ·

--

.
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convincing clarity.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
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Dear John:
I agree.
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Dear John:
In due course I will circulate a dissent.
Sincerely,

Justice Stevens
cc:

The Conference
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Re:
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Dear John:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

T.M.

Justice Stevens
cc:

The Conference

lfp/ss 03/23/84

BOSE SALLY-POW

82-1246 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union
Dear John:
I have now had an opportunity to read your
opinion with some care.

I am, of course, with you on the

result and,._o-:i"lat:-t ::r~ ~r
opiRiOR-i
My concern is primarily one of emphasis.

As you

state, in this case "two well-settled and respected rules
of law point in opposite directions".

It is clear, of

course, that iR efi~ ca!!'e~where a "public figure is suing
a media defendant for libel, New York Times requires proof
of actual malice.

It also is clear that New York Times,

2.
'

.

As you state (p. 13) , our "standard of review
must be faithful to both Rule 52(a) and the independent
review of New York Times.

My impression, however, as one

reads your opinion, is that it leaves little room for the
application of Rule 52(a) is any libel suit against the
media.

At Conference, Bill Brennan drew a distinction

between the type of evidence that an appellate court in
cases of this kind is obligated to review.
unnecessary

~

literally~eview

It is

the "entire record", but only

such portions of it as relate to the constitutional facts.
In this case, for example, the bench trial lasted 19 days.
There must be many facts, irrelevant to the constitutional
standard of New York Times, that are subject to Rule
52(a).

I am sure you would agree. It would be helpful if

this were made explicitly clear in our opinion.

3•

.~9~)

MM¥y-€e~e~R~c~g~r~n~l~·o&-~t~naet~ should take care not to

A

write this case in a way that weakens the application of
Rule 52(a)

in other types of cases

or~

with respect to non-constitutional facts.

in libel cases
The Court of

Appeals characterized its duty as being that of "de novo"
review.

It is important to state that CAl was incorrect

in characterizing the New York Times standard of review as
"de novo".

Perhaps you have said this, though I do not

recall having seen it.
The very last senten
is the duty of appellate judges, ·n cases of this kind, to
determine whether the

~~\) -~"~

This will be viewed, I think,

"()~ ~f~

~o\~
y~,~

1·-

the standard of review is "clear and

'

nvincing" rather than preponderance of the evidence.

~ 37b ~.S. J~

~'<IS-6-'6~. t-~~ ~

~ ~ ~~(_~j~ lot,~
~ ~~ ~ \~\J- ~'\~VM ~ ~ ~ , ( 9-". ~~,
SS$.!01\
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required this level of proof?
1s

If not, should we do

-~------~~

ca~

I add, John, a personal observation or two
frequent criticism that I hear of the Cou

that

opinions are unnecessarily long, and
nnecessarily include footnotes tha
bar.
uggest that any of

I do not

free from being "guilty" in both
I am embarrassed to read some of the
in past years by the dilution of

opinions

hat has resulted from how much I wrote and what I
n footnotes.

As I read your opinion, interesting and

written as it is, these questions came to mind as
have with respect to a fair number of all of the

5.
'

.

understand that

~--

o not say this in criticism.

Rather, I merely share

houghts that concern me about my own opinions.

Of

course, Bose Corp. will be a major First Amendment
/

ecision.

/

o(could make the clarifications
JOin you.
Sincerely,

Justice Stevens
lfp/ss
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TORTS, SECOND

Ch. 24

privilege" of publishing false and defamatory statements regarding a public official or public figure when there is no knowledge
of falsity or recklessness regarding truth or falsity. Here it is
held that the plaintiff has the burden of alleging and proving
that the defendant had knowledge or acted in reckless disregard.
f. Weight of evidence. Not only does the plaintiff have the
burden of raising the issue of knowledge or reckless disregard
and of proving that the defendant's conduct was outside the scope
of the constitutional protection, but the proof must be "with convincing clarity." This requirement, also described as one of "clear
and convincing proof," is held to be imposed by the Constitution.
Proof by more than a preponderance of the evidence has not
been specifically required for any other factual issue in a defamation action. Some language of the Supreme Court, however, has
suggested that this requirement may be imposed on the plaintiff
regarding the question of whether the communication was made
of and concerning the plaintiff. There may also be other issues
on which the Court will decide to impose the obligation of a higher degree of proof.
g. Constitutional standard; appellate review. The issue of
whether the defendant acted with knowledge of falsity or in reckless pisregard of truth or falsity is usually called one of fact that
is submitted to the jury for it to make a determination as to
whether the plaintiff has proved his contention with convincing
clarity. Actually, however, it involves both a determination of
the facts and an application to them of a standard, similar to the
determination of whether a defendant was negligent or not. The
determination here is one on which constitutional rights stand or
fall, and it is analogous in this regard to the classic instance in
criminal law of the constitutional guaranty against self-incrimination and the application of a constitutional standard for
determining whether a confession was given voluntarily or not.
A finding on an issue of this nature is subject to close appellate
scrutiny, and an appellate court may declare that the evidence is
constitutionally inadequate to sustain the finding. The United
States Supreme Court has on several occasions reviewed the
evidence to decide whether the evidence justified a finding of
knowledge or reckless disregard, and it has not hesitated to hold
that the constitutional requirement of proof with convincing
clarity has not been met, despite the jury verdict.
The Supreme Court has also stated that the issue of whether
the defamatory communication was made "of and concerning"
See Appendix for Reporter's Notes, Court Citations, and Cross References
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§ 580B

the plaintiff is one involving constitutional rights. It has held
on occasion that the evidence on this issue was constitutionally
defective because it was incapable of supporting a jury's finding
on this issue.
h. Public and private communications. Most of the Supreme
Court cases concerning the constitutional protection covered by
this Section have involved freedom of the press-newspapers,
magazines or broadcasting. All have involved public statements. It is therefore possible that since the protection applies
to statements about public officials or public figures it may be
confined to public communications and not be extended to those
made in a private fashion to one person or to a small number of
persons. But, on principle, there seems no reason to limit the
protection in this fashion. Why should one be constitutionally
protected if he issues a public statement about the qualifications
or character of the mayor of the city and yet not be protected if
he makes the same statement in the privacy of his home to his
next-door neighbor? Though the issue has not been specifically
raised, there would also appear to be little reason to draw a distinction between libel and slander in this regard.
i. Other applications of the Constitution to actions for defamation. This Section sets forth one of the most significant restrictions that the First Amendment to the Constitution has been
held to impose upon an action of defamation. After this restriction was established others were also held by the Supreme Court
to apply. Thus strict liability for defamation is no longer constitutional (see § 580B); recovery is limited, at least in some
cases, to actual harm proved to have been caused to reputation
(see § 621); and a defamation action does not lie for the expression of a mere opinion. (See § 566). On the constittuional
requirement of fault in the report of an official action or proceeding or a meeting open to the public that deals with a matter of
public concern, see § 611. On application of the Constitution
to an action for invasion of the right of privacy, see § § 652D and
652E.

§ 580B.

Defamation of Private Person

One who publishes a false and defamatory commmlicacation concerning a private person, or concerning a public official or public figure in relation to a purely private
matter not affecting his conduct, fitness or role in his
public capacity, is subject to liability, if, but only if, he
See Appendix for Reporter's Notes, Court Citations, and Cross References
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March 23, 1984

82-1246 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union

Dear John:
I have now had an opportunity to read your opinion
with some care. I am, of course, with you on the result and
certainly with the greater part of your opinion.
In light of the Conference discussion today of Dun

& Bradstreet (carried over for further consideration at next

week's Conference), woulr'! it not be Hell to make somewhat
clearer that this case involves only a media defendant?
This is implicit throughout your opinion, but t do not recall a soecific characterization of Consumers Union. Perhaps all that need be said is to add a few words on page 3.
You refer there to the DC havinq ruled that Bose rorp. is a
"public figure", and that therefore New York Times applieos.
I suggest that in 8th line, after the word "act1on" you
might add: "against a media defendant".
T have delayed joining your opinion also because
of some concern as to its emphasis. As you state, in this
case "two well-settled and respected rules of. law point in
opposite directions". It is clear, of course, where a "public fiqure is suing a media defendant for libel, New York
Times requires proof of actual malice. It also is clear
that New York Times, and is proqeny, require an appellate
court to "make an independent examination of the whole
record".

As you state (p. 13), our "standard of review must
be faithful to both Rule 52(a) and the independent review of
New York Times. My impression, however, as one reads your
opinion, is that it leaves little room for the application
of Rule 52(a) in any libel suit against the media. At Conference, Bill Brennan distinguished between the types of.
evidence that an appellate court reviews in a case of this
kind. It usually is unnecessary literally to review the
"entire r~cord", but only such portions of it as relate to
the constitutional facts. In this case, for example, the

2.

bench trial lasted 19 days. There must be many facts, irrelevant to the constitutional standard of New York Times,
that are subject to Rule 52(a). I am sure you would aqree.
It would be helpful if this were made explicitly clear in
our opinion.
We should take care, I think, not to write this
case in a way that weakens the app11cation of Rule 52(a) in
other types of cases or tn libel cases with respect to nonconstitutional facts. The Court of Appeals characterized
its nuty as being that of "de novo" review. Should we not
state that CAl was incorrect in characterizing the New York
Times standard of review as "de novo". Perhaps you have
said this, thouqh I do not recall havinq seen it.
If modest changes like these ara made T will be
happy to join you.

Sincerely,

Justice Stevens
lfp/ss
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JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

March 26, 1984

Re:

82-1246 - Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union

Dear Lewis:
Many thanks for your letter. As always, your
suggestions make good sense. I propose to add these
two footnote:
1)

Insert as new

~

in fn. 8 on p. 6:

We observe that respondent's publication of
Consumer Reports plainly would qualify it as a
"media" defendant in this action under any
conceivable definition of that term. Hence, the
answer to the question presented in Dunn &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,
certiorari granted,
U. S.
(1983) could
not affect this case and we naturally express no
view at this time on that question.
2)

Insert as fn. 31 on p. 27:

There are, of course, many findings of fact
in a defamation case that are irrelevant to the
constitutional standard of New York Times v.
Sullivan and to which the clearly erroneous
standard of Rule 52(a) is fully applicable.
Indeed, it is not actually necessary to review the
"entire" record to fulfill the function of
independent appellate review on the actual malice
question; rather, only those portions of the
record which relate to the actual malice
determination must be independently assessed. The
independent review function is not equivalent to a
"de novo" review of the ultimate judgment itself,
in which a reviewing court makes an original
appraisal of all the evidence to decide whether or
not it believes that judgment should be entered
for plaintiff. If the reviewing Court determines
that actual malice has been established with

-2-

convincing clarity, the judgment of the trial
court may only be reversed on the ground of some
other error of law or clearly erroneous finding of
fact. Although the Court of Appeals stated that
it must perform a de novo review, it is plain that
the Court of Appeals did not overturn any factual
finding to which Rule 52(a) would be applicable,
but instead engaged in an independent assessment
only of the evidence germane to the actual malice
determination.
Do you think these changes will be adequate?
Respectfully,

Justice Powell

.§npumt <lfourl Df Ur.t ,.nit.tlt .§tatt.tr

';Jiru4ittgton, ~. <If.

20.?~~

CHAMBERS OF'

.JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

March 26, 1984

Re:

82-1246 - Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union

Dear Lewis:
Many thanks for your letter. As always, your
suggestions make good sense. I propose to add these
two footnote:
1)

Insert as new

~

in fn. 8 on p. 6:

We observe that respondent's publication of
Consumer Reports plainly would qualify it as a
"media" defendant in this action under any
conceivable definition of that term. Hence, the
answer to the question presented in Dunn &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,
certiorari granted,
U. s.
(1983) could
not affect this case and we naturally express no
view at this time on that question.
2)

Insert as fn. 31 on p. 27:

There are, of course, many findings of fact
in a defamation case that are irrelevant to the
constitutional standard of New York Times v.
Sullivan and to which the clearly erroneous
standard of Rule 52(a) is fully applicable.
Indeed, it is not actually necessary to review the
"entire" record to fulfill the function of
independent appellate review on the actual malice
question~ rather, only those portions of the
record which relate to the actual malice
determination must be independently assessed. The
independent review function is not equivalent to a
"de novo" review of the ultimate judgment itself,
in which a reviewing court makes an original
appraisal of all the evidence to decide whether or
not it believes that judgment should be entered
for plaintiff. If the reviewing Court determines
that actual malice has been established with

-2-

convincing clarity, the judgment of the trial
court may only be reversed on the ground of some
other error of law or clearly erroneous finding of
fact. Although the Court of Appeals stated that
it must perform a de novo review, it is plain that
the Court of Appeals did not overturn any factual
finding to which Rule 52(a) would be applicable,
but instead engaged in an independent assessment
only of the evidence germane to the actual malice
determination.
Do you think these changes will be adequate?
Respectfully,

Justice Powell

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
Justice O'Connor
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 82-1246

BOSE CORPORATION, PETITIONER v. CONSUMERS
UNION OF UNITED STATES, INC.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
[March - , 1984]

JusTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
An unusual metaphor in a critical review of an unusual
loudspeaker system gave rise to product disparagement litigation that presents us with a procedural question of first impression: Does Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure prescribe the standard to be applied by the Court of
Appeals in its review of a District Court's determination that
a false statement was made with the kind of "actual malice"
described in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254,
279--280 (1964)?
In the May 1970 issue of its magazine, "Consumer Reports," respondent published a seven-page article evaluating
the quality of numerous brands of medium priced loudspeakers. In a boxed-off section occupying most of two pages, respondent commented on "some loudspeakers of special interest," one of which was the Bose 901-an admittedly "unique
and unconventional" system that had recently been placed on
the market by petitioner. 1 After describing the system and
some of its virtues, and after noting that a listener "could pinpoint the location of various instruments much more easily
1
In introducing the loudspeaker system to the marketplace, petitioner
emphasized the unconventional nature of the system and actively solicited
reviews in numerous publications thereby inviting critical evaluation and
comment on the unique qualities of the system. 508 F. Supp. 1249, 1273
(D. Mass. 1981).
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with a standard speaker than with the Bose system," respondent's article made the following statements:
"Worse, individual instruments heard through the
Bose system seemed to grow to gigantic proportions and
tended to wander about the room. For instance, a violin appeared to be 10 feet wide and a piano ·stretched
from wall to wall. With orchestral music, such effects
seemed inconsequential. But we think they might become annoying when listening to soloists." Plaintiff's
Exhibit 2, at 274.

Mter stating opinions concerning the overall sound quality,
the article concluded: "We think the Bose system is so unusual that a prospective buyer must listen to it and judge it
for himself. We would suggest delaying so big an investment until you were sure the system would please you after
the novelty value had worn off." I d., at 275.
Petitioner took exception to numerous statements made in
the article, and when respondent refused to publish a retraction, petitioner commenced this product disparagement action in the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts. 2 After a protracted period of pretrial discovery, the District Court denied respondent's motion for
summary judgment, 84 F. R. D. 682 (1980), and conducted a
19-day bench trial on the issue of liability. In its lengthy,
detailed opinion on the merits of the case, 508 F. Supp. 1249
2
Federal jurisdiction over the product disparagement claim was based
on diversity of citizenship, 28 U. S. C. § 1332(a)(1). The law of New York
and Massachusetts, viewed by the parties as in accord in this area, governed the product disparagement claim. 508 F. Supp. , at 1259 n. 17. The
District Court held that under the applicable state law, plaintiff had the
burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the statements in issue were false and disparaging, and also had the burden of
establishing actual damages in order to recover. !d., at 1259-1260. In addition to the product disparagement claim, petitioner alleged claims for unfair competition and a violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1121.
The District Court held that neither of those claims had been proven. 508
F. Supp., at 1277.
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(1981), the District Court ruled in respondent's favor on
most issues. 3 Most significantly, the District Court ruled
that the petitioner is a "public figure" as that term is defined
in Gertz v. Robert Welsh, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 342, 345,
351-352 (1974) for purposes of this case and therefore the
First Amendment, as interpreted in New York Times v. Sullivan, supra, 376 U. S., at 27~280, precludes recovery in \
this product disparagement action unless the petitioner
proved by clear and convincing evidence that respondent
made a false disparaging statement with "actual malice."
On three critical points, however, the District Court
agreed with petitioner. First, it found that one sentence in
Petitioner's attack on the article included contentions that it was misleading in referring to two persons as a "panel" and in creating the impression that evaluations of loudspeaker quality are objective rather than subjective judgments. While the District Court agreed with petitioner on
these points, it ruled that they did not entitle petitioner to relief. 508 F .
Supp., at 1260-1262. Petitioner also argued that the overall sound quality
of the Bose 901 should have been rated higher by the reviewers. The District Court rejected this claim, observing that all of the testimony, including that of Dr. Bose, revealed that the evaluation of a speaker's "sound
quality" or "accuracy" is a "subjective matter," and hence in the final analysis is "nothing more than an opinion and, as such, it cannot be proved to be
true of false." Id., at 1262. The court also found that petitioner had
failed to prove false a statement recommending use of an amplifier of 50
watts per channel to achieve the "deepest" bass response with the speakers, observing that the parties had conceded that the power requirements
of the speakers were readily and objectively ascertainable. I d., at
1263-1264. The court also found that petitioner had failed to prove that
the person primarily responsible for the article was biased by reason of his
financial interest in eventually marketing a speaker on which he had obtained a patent. On the other hand, the District Court rejected respondent's argument that there could be no actual malice because respondent
had no motive to distort the facts; the District Court identified two possible
reasons for the disparagement, first, the "scant proof" that respondent had
a "built in bias" against "higher priced products" and second, a suggestion
in the testimony that respondent resorted to "sarcasm" to boost circulation. Id., at 1275-1276. The District Court did not, however, rely upon
these possible motivations as affirmative proof of actual malice. See id.,
at 1276-1277.
3
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the article contained a "false" statement of "fact" concerning the tendency of the instruments to wander. 4 Based primarily on testimony by the author of the article, the District
Court found that instruments heard through the speakers
tended to wander "along the wall," rather than "about the
- room" as reported by respondent. 5 Second, it found that the
statement was disparaging. Third, it concluded "on the
basis of proof which it considers clear and convincing, that
the plaintiff has sustained its burden of proving that the defendant published a false statement of material fact with
• In its ruling on respondent's motion for summary judgment, the District Court had held that the question whether respondent's panelists "actually heard instruments grow to gigantic proportions or wander about the
room is a question of fact, not opinion.... " 84 F. R. D., at 684. In support of the motion for summary judgment, respondent had submitted an
affidavit by one of the panelists, Arnold Seligson, stating that the article
accurately reported what was heard in the tests and "I know what I
heard," while petitioner had submitted an affidavit by Dr. Bose, who designed the Bose 901, stating in substance that "the phenomenom of widened and wandering instruments ... is a scientific impossibility." Ibid.
• Although at one point the District Court seemed to suggest that the
instruments, i. e. the sound, did not wander at all, relying on a review in
another publication stating that "each instrument has its prescribed
space-and it stays there," 508 F. Supp., at 1268 (emphasis supplied by the
District Court) (citation omitted), the District Court had previously stated
that some degree of "movement" of sound between loudspeakers is common to all systems and its discussion of liability indicates that respondent
could have truthfully reported that the sound tended to wander "along the
wall," or at least "seemed" to wander along the wall. It is not entirely
clear that the District Court made a finding of fact as such regarding where
the sound tended to wander. Indeed, it is not entirely clear that he found
as a fact that the sound did not wander about the room. Rather, as discussed more extensively infra, at - - , the finding seemed to be that the
"panel" conducting the test did not subjectively perceive the sound to be
wandering "about the room," but rather perceived it to be wandering
"across the room." Just where the sound did "wander," in reality, did not
appear to be the focus of the decision, though there was conflicting testimony concerning whether it was "scientifically impossible" for sound to
wander "about" the room, or to "seem" to wander "about" the room. See
508 F. Supp., at 1267-1269, 127~1277.
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knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of its
truth or falsity." 508 F. Supp., at 1277. 6 Judgment was
entered for petitioner on the product disparagement claim. 7
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
reversed. 692 F. 2d 189 (1982). The court accepted the finding that the comment about wandering instruments was disparaging. It assumed, without deciding, that the statement
was one of fact, rather than opinion, and that it was false, observing that "stemming at least in part from the uncertain
nature of the statement as one of fact or opinion, it is difficult
to determine with confidence whether it is true or false."
I d., at 194. After noting that petitioner did not contest the
conclusion that it was a public figure, or the applicability of
the New York Times standard, the Court of Appeals held
that its review of the "actual malice" determination was not
6
In its ruling on the motion for summary judgment, the District Court
assumed, without deciding, that the actual malice standard would be applicable in the case and expressly recognized that falsity alone does not prove
that statements were made with actual malice, observing that additional
facts are required, and that there must be clear and convincing evidence on
this question. 84 F. R. D., at 684-685. In holding that there was a material issue of "fact" (a label we use advisedly) on actual malice, the District
Court recounted petitioner's argument that the panelists must have known
the statements concerning enlarged and wandering instruments were false
because they were false, ibid. ("[A]ccording to plaintiff, the panel could not
have heard these phenomena and the statement that they did hear them
was false. The plaintiff further contends that because Seligson was a
member of the listening panel .. . he must have known that the statement
was false . . .. "). The court also noted petitioner's evidence concerning
Seligison's patent on a speak~r system, and indulging in all reasonable inferences favorable to the plaintiff, concluded that a genuine issue of material fact existed on the question of actual malice. !d., at 686.
7
A separate trial before a different judge on the issue of damages resulted in a finding that the false disparaging statement resulted in a sales
loss of 824 units, each of which would have produced a net profit of $129,
causing petitioner damages of $106,296. Petitioner also was awarded
$9,000 for expenses incurred in an attempt to mitigate damages. Judgment for the total amount, plus interest, was entered by the District
Court. 529 F. Supp. 357 (1981).
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"limited" to the clearly erroneous standard of Rule 52(a); instead, it stated that it "must perform a de novo review, independently examining the record to ensure that the district
court has applied properly the governing constitutional law
and that the plaintiff has indeed satisfied its burden of proof."
I d., at 195. It added, however, that it "was in no position to
consider the credibility of witnesses and must leave such
questions of demeanor to the trier of fact." Ibid. Based on
its own review of the record, the Court of Appeals concluded:
"[W]e are unable to find clear and convincing evidence
that CU published the statement that individual instruments tended to wander about the room with knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it
was false or not. The evidence presented merely shows
that the words in the article may not have described precisely what the two panelists heard during the listening
test. CU was guilty of using imprecise language in the
article-perhaps resulting from an attempt to produce a
readable article for its mass audience. Certainly this
does not support an inference of actual malice." I d., at
197. 8
We granted certiorari to consider whether the Court of
Appeals erred when it refused to apply the clearly erroneous
standard of Rule 52(a) to the District Court's "finding" of actual malice. - - U . S . - (1983).
8

Judge Campbell concurred specially to emphasize the fact that the
Court of Appeals had not passed on the merits of the District Court's holding that petitioner was a public figure. We, of course, also do not pass on
that question.
We observe that respondent's publication of Consumer Reports plainly
would qualify it as a "media" defendant in this action under any conceivable
definition of that term. Hence, the answer to the question presented in
Dunn & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., certiorari granted,
U. S . - (1983) could not affect this case and we naturally express
no view at this time on that question.
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I

To place the issue in focus, it is necessary to state in somewhat greater detail (a) the evidence on the "actual malice"
issue; and (b) the basis for the District Court's determination.
Evidence of Actual Malice.
At trial petitioners endeavored to prove that the key sentence embodied three distinct falsehoods about instruments
heard through the Bose system: (1) that their size seemed
grossly enlarged; (2) that they seemed to move; and (3) that
their movement was "about the room."
Although a great deal of the evidence concerned the first
two points, the District Court found that neither was false.
It concluded that the average reader would understand that
the reference to enlarged instruments was intended to describe the size of the area from which the sound seemed to
emanate rather than to any perception about the actual size
of the musical instruments being played, rejecting as "absurd" the notion that readers would interpret the figurative
language literally. 508 F. Supp., at 1266. 9 After referring to
testimony explaining "that a certain degree of movement of
the apparent sound source is to be expected with all stereo
loudspeaker systems," the District Court recognized that the
statement was accurate insofar as it reported that "instruments ... tended to wander.... " !d., at 1267. Thus, neither the reference to the apparent size of the instruments,
nor the reference to the fact that instruments appeared to
9
"Therefore, the plaintiff did not present any evidence to contradict the
defendant's evidence which tended to show that when listening to the Bose
901 a listener could and does perceive that the apparent sound source is
very large. Thus, the court concludes that the plaintiff has not sustained
its burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's
statement-'instruments ... seemed to grow to gigantic proportions'was false." 508 F. Supp., at 1267.
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move, was false. 10
The statement that instruments tended to wander "about
the room" was found false because what the listeners in the
test actually perceived was an apparent movement back and
forth along the wall in front of them and between the two
speakers. Because an apparent movement "about the
room"-rather than back and forth-would be so different
from what the average listener has learned to expect, the
District Court concluded "that the location of the movement
of the apparent sound source is just as critical to a reader as
the fact that movement occurred." Ibid.
The evidence concerning respondent's knowledge of this
falsity focused on Arnold Seligson, an engineer employed by
respondent. Seligson supervised the test of the Bose 901
and prepared the written report upon which the published article was based. His initial in-house report contained this
sentence: "'Instruments not only could not be placed with
precision but appeared to suffer from giganticism and a tendency to wander around the room; a violin seemed about 10 ft.
wide, a piano stretched from wall to wall, etc.'" I d., at 1264,
n. 28. Since the editorial revision from "around the room" to
"about the room" did not change the meaning of the false
statement, and since there was no evidence that the editors
were aware of the inaccuracy in the original report, the actual malice determination rests entirely on an evaluation of
Seligson's state of mind when he wrote his initial report, or
when he checked the article against that report.
Seligson was deposed before trial and testified for almost
six days at the trial itself. At one point in his direct examination, he responded at length to technical testimony by Dr.
Bose, explaining the scientific explanation for the apparent
movement of the source of sound back and forth across a wall.
Joint App. 117-122. The trial judge then questioned
10
Thus, respondent prevailed on both of the issues of fact that had been
identified at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings. See n. 4,

supra.

82-1246--0PINION
BOSE CORP. v. CONSUMERS UNION OF U.S., INC.

9

Seligson, and that questioning revealed that the movement
which Seligson had heard during the tests was confined to the
wall. 11 During his cross-examination, at counsel's request he
drew a rough sketch of the movement of the sound source
that he intended to describe with the words "tended to wander about the room"; that sketch revealed a back and forth
movement along the wall between the speakers. He was
then asked:
"Q. Mr. Seligson, why did you use the words 'tended
to wander about the room' to describe what you have
drawn on the board?
"A. Well, I don't know what made me pick that particular choice of words. Would you have been more satisfied if we said 'across,'-I think not-instead of before.
I have the feeling you would have objected in either
event. The word 'about' meant just as I drew it on the
11

The following questions were asked and answered:

"Q. Does that explain, in your opinion, the lateral movement of the

instrument?
"A. Yes.
"Q. I think your statement in the article which says they moved into the
room, just as if they came forward, as well- ·
"A. The example given for the movement into the room refers only to a
widened violin and a widened piano and was meant to imply only that the
widening and movement was across the rear wall from the two speakers.
"Q. 'It tended to wander about the room.' It didn't say from side to
side or against the walls alone, but it says"A. I believe the next sentence is meant to explain that. It then says,
'For instance,' as an example of the effect.
"Q. The word 'about' means around, doesn't it?
"A. It was, your Honor, it was meant to mean about the rear wall, between the speakers.
"Q. That isn't what it says, though.
"A. I understand."
Joint App. 122-124
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board. Now, I so testified in my deposition"--Joint
App. 169.'2

The District Court's Actual Malice Determination.
The District Court's reasons for finding falsity in the description of the location of the movement of the wandering instruments provided the background for its ruling on actual
malice. The court concluded that "no reasonable reader"
would understand the sentence as describing lateral movement along the wall. Because the "average reader" would
interpret the word "about" according to its "plain ordinary
meaning," the District Court unequivocally rejected
Seligson's testimony-and respondent's argument-that the
sentence, when read in context, could be understood to refer
to lateral movement. 13
12

These additional questions were then asked and answered:

"Q. Would it have been more accurate in your judgment to say that the

instruments tended to move back and forth between the two speakers?
"A. No, I don't think so, taken in context of the way it's described. Remember, the effect is carefully described in a few sentences later. It's
hard to mistake.
"Q. Is there anything in the article which you think conveys to the
reader the idea that the instruments stayed down at one end of the room
and didn't come out and wander about, like you wandered about, where
you have drawn the orange line?
"A. Yes.
"Q. What is that?
"A. I would think that the reader would get that from reading that a
violin appeared to be ten feet wide and a piano stretched from wall to wall.
This is no hint of depth or whatever, entering into the room." Joint App.
169-170.
13
The District Court buttressed this conclusion by pointing out that petitioner had received no complaints from purchasers about any wandering
instruments, and that no other reviews of the Bose 901 had referred to
wandering instruments. On the contrary, a review quoted by the District
Court commented that "each instrument has its prescribed space-and it
stays there." Seen. 5, supra. This evidence, however, was more probative of falsity in ascribing any movement at all to the sound source than of
falsity in describing the location of the movement. As we have pointed
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On similar reasoning the District Court found Seligson's
above-quoted explanation of the intended meaning of the sentence incredible. · The District Court reasoned:
"Thus, according to Seligson, the words used in the
Article-'About the room'-mean something different to
him than they do to the populace in general. If Seligson
is to be believed, at the time of publication of the Article
he interpreted, and he still interprets today, the words
'about the room' to mean 'along the wall.' After careful
consideration of Seligson's testimony and of his demeanor at trial, the Court finds that Seligson's testimony
on this point is not credible. Seligson is an intelligent
person whose knowledge of the English language cannot
be questioned. It is simply impossible for the Court to
believe that he interprets a commonplace word such as
'about' to mean anything other than its plain ordinary
meaning.
"Based on the above finding that Seligson's testimony
to the contrary is not credible, the Court further finds
that at the time of the Article's publication Seligson
knew that the words 'individual instruments ... tended
to wander about the room' did not accurately describe
the effects that he and Lefkow had heard during the
'special listening test.' Consequently, the Court concludes, on the basis of proof which it considers clear and
convincing, that the plaintiff has sustained its burden of
proving that the defendant published a false statement of
material fact with the knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of its truth or falsity.'' 508 F. Supp.,
at 1276--1277.
Notably, the District Court's ultimate determination of actual malice was framed as a conclusion and was stated in the
disjunctive. Even though the District Court found it imposout, the District Court found that the article was truthful insofar as it
stated that apparent movement occured.
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sible to believe that Seligson-at the time of trial-was
truthfully maintaining that the words "about the room" could
fairly be read, in context, to describe lateral movement
rather than irregular movement throughout the room, the
District Court did not identify any independent evidence that
Seligman realized the inaccuracy of the statement, or entertained serious doubts about its truthfulness, at the time of
publication. 14
II
This is a case in which two well settled and respected rules
of law point in opposite directions.
Petitioner correctly reminds us that Rule 52(a) provides:
"Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the
witnesses."
We have repeatedly held that the rule means what it says.
Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456
U. S. 844, 855-856 (1982); Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456
U. S. 273, 287 (1982); United States v. United States Gypsum
Co., 333 U. S. 364, 394-396 (1948). It surely does not
stretch the language of the rule to characterize an inquiry
into what a person knew at a given point in time as a question
of "fact." 15 In this case, since the trial judge expressly commented on Seligson's credibility, petitioner argues that the
Court of Appeals plainly erred when it refused to uphold the
District Court's actual malice "finding" under the clearly erroneous standard of Rule 52(a).
On the other hand, respondent correctly reminds us that in
cases raising First Amendment issues we have repeatedly
The District Court expressly rejected petitioner's exhaustive attempt
to prove that Seligson had a continuing interest in marketing his own
speaker and therefore deliberately distorted the review. 508 F. Supp., at
1275.
16
Indeed, in Herbert v. Lando, 441 U. S. 153, 170 (1979) we referred in
passing to actual malice as "ultimate fact."
14
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held that an appellate court has an obligation to "make an independent examination of the whole record" in order to make
sure "that the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression." New York Times v.
Sullivan, supra, 376 U. S., at 284-286. See also NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware, 458 U. S. 886, 93~934 (1983); Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Assn. v. Bressler, 398 U. S. 6,
11 (1970); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U. S. 727, 732-733
(1968). Although such statements have been made most frequently in cases to which Rule 52(a) does not apply because
they arose in state courts, respondent argues that the constitutional principle is equally applicable to federal litigation.
We quite agree; surely it would pervert the concept of federalism for this Court to lay claim to a broader power of review
over state court judgments than it exercises in reviewing the
judgments of intermediate federal courts.
Our standard of review must be faithful to both Rule 52(a)
and the rule of independent review applied in New York
Times v. Sullivan. The conflict between the two rules is in
some respects more apparent than real. The New York
Times rule emphasizes the need for an appellate court to
make an independent examination of the entire record; Rule
52(a) never forbids such an examination, and indeed our seminal decision on the rule expressly contemplated a review of
the entire record, stating that a "finding is 'clearly erroneous'
when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing
court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed." United
States v. Gypsum Co., supra, 333 U. S., at 395 (emphasis
supplied). Moreover, Rule 52(a) commands that "due regard" shall be given to the trial judge's opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses; the constitutionallybased rule of independent review permits this opportunity to
be given its due. Indeed, as we previously observed, the
Court of Appeals in this case expressly declined to secondguess the district judge on the credibility of the witnesses.
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The requirement that special deference be given to a trial
judge's credibility determinations is itself a recognition of the
broader proposition that the presumption of correctness that
attaches to factual findings is stronger in some cases than in
others. The same "clearly erroneous" standard applies to
findings based on documentary evidence as to those based entirely on oral testimony, see United States Gypsum Co.,
supra, 333 U. S., at 394, but the presumption has lesser force
in the former situation than in the latter. Similarly, the
standard does not change as the trial becomes longer and
more complex, but the likelihood that the appellate court will
rely on the presumption tends to increase when trial judges
have lived with the controversy for weeks or months instead
of just a few hours. 16 One might therefore assume that the
cases in which the appellate courts have a duty to exercise
independent review are merely those in which the presumption that the trial court's ruling is correct is particularly
weak. The difference between the two rules, however, is
much more than a mere matter of degree. For the rule of
independent review assigns to judges a constitutional responsibility that cannot be delegated to the trier of fact, whether
"The conclusiveness of a 'finding of fact' depends on the nature of the
materials on which the finding is based. The finding even of a so-called
'subsidiary fact' may be a more or less difficult process varying according to
the simplicity or sublety of the type of 'fact' in controversy. Finding socalled ultimate 'facts' more clearly implies the application of standards of
law. And so the 'finding offact' even if made by two courts may go beyond
the determination that should not be set aside here. Though labeled 'finding of fact,' it may involve the very basis on which judgment of fallible evidence is to be made. Thus, the conclusion that may appropriately be
drawn from the whole mass of evidence is not always the ascertainment of
the kind of 'fact' that precludes consideration by this Court. See, e. g.,
Beyer v. LeFevre, 186 U. S. 114. Particularly is this so where a decision
here for review cannot escape broadly social judgments-judgments lying
close to opinion regarding the whole nature of our Government and the duties and immunities of citizenship." Baumgartner v. United States, 322
U. S. 665, 670-671 (1944). See generally Pullman-Standard v. Swint,
supra, 456 U. S., at 286-287 n. 16.
'

6

'

.
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the factfinding function be performed in the particular case
by a jury or by a trial judge.
Rule 52(a) applies to findings of fact, including those described as "ultimate facts" because they may determine the
outcome of litigation. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint,
supra, 456 U. S., at 287. But Rule 52(a) does not inhibit an
appellate court's power to correct errors of law, including
those that may infect a so-called mixed finding of law and
fact, or a finding of fact that is predicated on a misunderstanding of the governing rule of law. See ibid.; Inwood
Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., supra, 456
U. S., at 855 n. 15. Nor does Rule 52(a) "furnish particular
guidance with respect to distinguishing law from fact."
Pullman Standard v. Swint, supra, 456 U. S., at 288.
What we have characterized as "the vexing nature" of that
distinction, ibid., does not, however, diminish its importance,
or the importance of the principles that require the distinction to be drawn in certain cases. 17
In a consideration of the possible application of the distinction to the issue of "actual malice," at least three characteristics of the rule enunciated in the New York Times case are
relevant. First, the common law heritage of the rule itself
assigns an especially broad role to the judge in applying it to
specific factual situations. Second, the content of the rule is
not revealed simply by its literal text, but rather is given
meaning through the evolutionary process of common law adjudication; though the source of the rule is found in the Con17
A finding of fact in some cases is inseparable from the principles
through which it was deduced. At some point, the reasoning by which a
fact is "found" crosses the line between application of those ordinary principles of logic and common experience which are ordinarily entrusted to the
finder of fact into the realm of a legal rule upon which the reviewing court
must exercise its own independent judgment. Where the line is drawn
varies according to the nature of the substantive law at issue. Regarding
certain largely factual questions in some areas of the law, the stakes-in
terms of impact on future cases and future conduct-are too great to entrust them finally to the judgment of the trier of fact.
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stitution, it is nevertheless largely a judge-made rule of law.
Finally, the constitutional values protected by the rule make
it imperative that judges-and in some cases judges of this
Court-make sure that it is correctly applied. A few words
about each of these aspects of the rule are appropriate.
The federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood unless he proves
that the false "statement was made with 'actual malice'-that
is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not," New York Times, supra,
376 U. S., at 279-280, has its counterpart in rules previously
adopted by a number of state courts and extensively reviewed by scholars for generations. 18 The earlier defamation
cases, in turn, have a kinship to English cases considering the
kind of motivation that must be proved to support a common
law action for deceit. 19 It has long been recognized that the
formulation of a rule of this kind "allows the judge the maximum of power in passing judgment in the particular case." 20
Moreover, the exercise of this power is the process through
which the rule itself evolves and its integrity is maintained. 21
18
A representative list of such cases and comments is found in footnote
20 of the Court's opinion in New York Times, supra, 376 U. S., at 280.
19
Under what has been characterized as the "honest liar" formula, fraud
could be proved "when it is shown that a false representation has been
made (1) knowinging, or (2) without belief in its truth, or (3) recklessly,
careless whether it be true or false." Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337, 374
(1889).
20
"Probably the formula is less definite than it seems. Its limitations
are perhaps largely a matter of language color. As do most English formulas, it allows the judge the maximum of power in passing judgment in
the particular case. It restricts the jury as neatly as can be done to the
function of evaluating the evidence. But judgment under this formula can
be turned either way with equal facility on any close case." L. Green,
Judge and Jury, 286 (1930) (Chapter 10 of this work by Professor Green,
cited herein, is also published in 16 Va. L. Rev. 749 (1930)).
''"And it must be kept in mind that the judge has another distinct function in dealing with these elements, which though not frequently called into
play, is of the utmost importance. It involves the determination of the

82-1246--0PINION
BOSE CORP. v. CONSUMERS UNION OF U. S., INC.

17

As we have explained, the meaning of some concepts cannot
be adequately expressed in a simple statement:
"These considerations fall short of proving St. Amant's
reckless disregard for the accuracy of his statements
about Thompson. 'Reckless disregard,' it is true, cannot be fully encompassed in one infallible definition. Inevitably its outer limits will be marked out through caseby-case adjudication, as is true with so many legal
standards for judging concrete cases, whether the standard is provided by the Constitution, statutes, or case
law. Our cases, however, have furnished meaningful
guidance for the further definition of a reckless publication." St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U. S. 727, 730-731
(1968).

When the standard governing the decision of a particular
case is provided by the Constitution, this Court's role in
marking out the limits of the standard through the process of
case-by-case adjudication is of special importance. This
process has been vitally important in cases involving restrictions on the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment, particularly in those cases in which it is contended that
the communication in issue is within one of the few classes of
"unprotected" speech.
The First Amendment presupposes that the freedom to
speak one's mind is not only an aspect of individual libertyand thus a good unto itself-but also is essential to the common quest for truth and the vitality of society as a whole.
Under our Constitution "there is no such thing as a false idea.
However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its
correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on
scope of the general formula , or some one of its elements. It comes into
play in marginal cases. It requires the judge to say what sort of conduct
can be considered as condemned under the rules which are employed in
such cases. It is the function through which the formulas and rules themselves were evolved, through which their integrity is maintained and their
availability determined." L. Green, Judge and Jury, 304 (1930).
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the competition of other ideas." Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., supra, 418 U. S., at 339-340 (footnote omitted). Nevertheless, there are categories of communcation and certain
special utterences to which the majestic protection of the
First Amendment does not extend because they "are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." Chaplinsky v. New Hamphire,
315 u. s. 568, 572 (1942).
Libelous speech has been held to constitute one such category, see Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U. S. 250 (1952); others that have been held to be outside the scope of the freedom
of speech are fighting words, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U. S. 568 (1942), incitement to riot, Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U. S. 444 (1969), obscenity, Roth v. United States,
354 U. S. 476 (1957), and child pornography, New York v.
Ferber, 458 U. S. 747 (1982). 22 In each of these areas, the
Commercial speech was once regarded as unprotected by the First
Amendment, see Valentine v. Chrestensen , 316 U. S. 52 (1942), but in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U. S.
748 (1976), we rejected that broad conclusion. Though false and misleading commercial speech could be deemed to represent a category of unprotected speech, see ibid., the rationale for doing so would be essentially the
same as that involved in the libel area, viz. "[T]here is no constitutional
value in false statements of fact." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.,
at 340. Moreover, since a commercial advertiser usually "seeks to disseminate information about a specific prduct or service he himself provides and
presumably knows more about than anyone else," Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumer Council, supra, 425 U. S., at 772 n. 24,
there is a mininal "danger that governmental regulation of false or misleading price or product advertising will chill accurate and nondeceptive commercial expression." Id., at 777 (Stewart, J . concurring).
Statements made by public employees in their employment capacity and
not touching on matters of public concern may be considered unprotected
in the sense that employment-related sanctions may be imposed on the
basis of such statements. See Connick v. Myers, - - U. S. - - (1983);
Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated Schood District, 439 U. S. 410
(1979); Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 563 (1968).
22
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limits of the unprotected category, as well as the unprotected
character of particular communications, has been determined
by the judicial evaluation of special facts that have been
deemed to have constitutional significance. In such cases,
the Court has regularly conducted an independent review of
the record both to be sure that the speech in question actually
falls within the unprotected category and to confine the perimeters of any unprotected category within acceptably narrow limits in an effort to ensure that protected expression
will not be inhibited. Providing triers of fact with a general
description of the type of communication whose content is unworthy of protection has not, in and of itself, served sufficiently to narrow the category, nor served to eliminate the
danger that decisions by triers of fact may inhibit the expression of protected ideas. 23 The principle of viewpoint neutrality that underlies the First Amendment itself, see Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92, 95-96 (1972),
also imposes a special responsibility on judges whenever it is
claimed that a particular communciation is unprotected. See
generally, Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1, 4 (1949).
We have exercised independent judgment on the question
whether particular remarks "were so inherently inflammatory as to come within that small class of 'fighting words'
which are 'likely to provoke the average person to retaliation,
and thereby cause a breach of the peace;'" Street v. New
York, 394 U. S. 576, 592 (1969), and on the analogous question whether advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action, Hess v. Indiana, 414 U. S. 105,
108-109 (1973) (per curiam); compare id., at 111 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting) ("The simple explanation for the result
in this case is that the majority has interpreted the evidence
The risk of broadening a category of unprotected speech may explain
why one Member of this Court preferred a candid statement-"! know it
when I see it,"-of his concept of the judicial function to a premature attempt to fashion an all encompassing "shorthand description" of obscenity.
See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U. S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J ., concurring).
23

82-124~0PINION

20

BOSE CORP. v. CONSUMERS UNION OF U. S., INC.

differently from the courts below."); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229 (1963) (recognizing duty "to make an independent examination of the whole record."); Pennekamp v.
Florida, 328 U. S. 331, 335 (1946) ("[W]e are compelled to examine for ourselves the statements in issue to see whether or
not they do carry a threat of clear and present danger ... or
whether they are of a character which the principles of the
First Amendment . . . protect."). 24
Similarly, although under Miller v. California, 413 U. S.
15 (1973), the questions of what appeals to "prurient interest"
and what is "patently offensive" under the community standard obscenity test are "essentially questions of fact," id., at
30, we expressly recognized the "ultimate power of appellate courts to conduct an independent review of constitutional
claims when necessary," id., at 25. 25 We have therefore re24
See also Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U. S. 380, 385-387 (1927) (explaining
that this Court will review findings of fact by a State court where a federal
right has been denied on the basis of a fact without evidence to support it
and where a conclusion of law as to a federal right and a finding of fact are
so intermingled to require analysis of the facts); Gitlow v. New York, 268
U. S. 652, 665--666 (1925); see also Schaefer v. United States, 251 U. S.
466, 483 (1920) (Brandeis, J. , dissenting); see generally Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601, 613-Q14 (1973) (explaining Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229 (1963); Cox v. Louisinana, 372 U. S. 536 (1963); and
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 311 (1940)).
25
In support of this statement, we cited Justice Harlan's opinion in Roth
v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 497-498 (1957), where he observed:
"The Court seems to assume that 'obscenity' is a peculiar genus of 'speech
and press,' which is as distinct, recognizable, and classifiable as poison ivy
is among other plants. On this basis the constitutional question before us
simply becomes whether 'obscenity,' as an abstraction, is protected by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments, and the question whether a particular
book may be suppressed becomes a mere matter of classification, of 'fact,'
to be entrusted to a factfinder and insulated from independent constitutional judgment. But surely the problem cannot be solved in such a generalized fashion. Every communication has an individuality and 'value' of
its own. The suppression of a particular writing or other tangible form of
expression is, therefore, an individual matter, and in the nature of things
every such suppression raises an individual constitutional problem, in
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jected the contention that a jury finding of obscenity vel non
is insulated from review so long as the jury was properly instructed and there is some evidence to support its findings,
holding that substantive constitutional limitations govern.
In Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U. S. 153, 159-161 (1974), based
on an independent examination of the evidence-the exhibition of a motion picture-the Court held that the film in
question "could not, as a matter of constitutional law, be
found to depict sexual conduct in a patently offensive
way .... " ld., at 161. 26 And in its recent opinion identifying
a new category of unprotected expression-child pornography-the Court expressly anticipated that an "independent
examination" of the allegedly unprotected material may be
necessary "to assure ourselves that the judgment ... 'does
not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression."' New York v. Ferber, supra, 458 U. S., at 774 n.
28 (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, supra, 376 U. S.,
at 285).
which a reviewing court must determine for itself whether the attacked expression is suppressable within constitutional standards. Since those
standards do not readily lend themselves to generalized definitions, the
constitutional problem in the last analysis becomes one of particularized
judgments which appellate courts must make for themselves.
"I do nof think that reviewing courts can escape this responsibility by
saying that the trier of facts, be it a jury or a judge, has labeled the questioned matter as 'obscene,' for, if 'obscenity' is to be suppressed, the question whether a particular work is of that character involves not really an
issue of fact but a question of constitutional judgment of the most sensitive
and delicate kind."
26
Compare Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S. 87, 100, 124 (1974)
(holding that jury determination of obscenity was supported by the evidence and consistent with the applicable constitutional standard while reviewing petitioner's sufficiency of the evidence arguments regarding other
issues under the test of Glasser v. United States, 418 U. S. 124 (1942)). See
generally Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U. S. 184, 187-190 (opinion of
BRENNAN, J.) (de novo review required in obscenity cases); id., at 202-203
(Warren, C. J., dissenting) (intermediate standard of review).
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Hence, in New York Times v. Sullivan, after announcing
the constitutional requirement for a finding of "actual malice"
in certain types of defamation actions, it was only natural
that we should conduct an independent review of the evidence on the dispositive constitutional issue. We explained
our action as follows:
"This Court's duty is not limited to the elaboration of
constitutional principles; we must also in proper cases review the evidence to make certain that those principles
have been constitutionally applied. This is such a case,
particularly since the question is one of alleged trespass
across 'the line between speech unconditionally guaranteed and speech which may legitimately be regulated.'
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 525. In cases where
that line must be drawn, the rule is that we 'examine for
ourselves the statements in issue and the circumstances
under which they were made to see . . . whether they
are of a character which the principles of the First
Amendment, as adopted by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, protect.' Pennekamp v.
Florida, 328 U. S. 331, 335; see also One, Inc. v. Olesen,
355 U. S. 371; Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355
U. S. 372. We must 'make an independent examination
of the whole record,' Edwards v. South Carolina, 372
U. S. 229, 235, so as to assure ourselves that the judgment does not constitute a forbidden instrusion on the
field of free expression." New York Times v. Sullivan,
supra, 376 U. S., at 285 (footnote omitted). 27
27
This Court "has an 'obligation to test challenged judgments against the
guarantees of the First and Fourteenth Amendments,' and in doing so 'this
Court cannot avoid making an independent constitutional judgment on the
facts of the case.' Jacabellis v. Ohio 378 U. S. 184, 190 (1964) [opinion of
BRENNAN, J.]. The simple fact is that First Amendment questions of
'constitutional fact' compel this Court's de novo review. See Edwards v.
South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229, 235 (1963); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361
U. S. 199, 205 n. 5 (1960).'' Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U. S. 29, 54
(1971) (opinion of BRENNAN, J., joined by BURGER, C. J., and
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In Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U. S. 279 (1971), a case in which
the federal District Court had entered a directed verdict, we
again conducted an independent examination of the evidence
on the question of actual malice, labeling our definition of "actual malice" as a "constitutional rule" and stating that the
question before us was whether that rule had been correctly
applied to the facts of the case, id., at 284. Again we stated
that independent inquiries "of this kind are familiar under the
settled principle that '[i]n cases in which there is a claim of
denial of rights under the Federal Constitution, this Court is
not bound by the conclusions of lower courts, but will re-examine the evidentiary basis on which those conclusions are
founded,'" noting that "in cases involving the area of tension
between the First and Fourteenth Amendments on the one
hand and state defamation laws on the other, we have frequently had occasion to review 'the evidence in the . . .
record to determine whether it could constitutionally support
a judgment' for the plaintiff." Ibid. (citations omitted) 28
BLACKMUN, J.). See generally Adams v. Tanner, 244 U. S. 590, 600
(1917) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("Ex facto jus oritur. That ancient rule
must prevail in order that we may have a system of living law.").
In New York Times v. Sullivan, we were reviewing a state court judgment entered on a jury verdict. Respondent had contended that the Seventh Amendment precluded an independent review. Recognizing that the
Seventh Amendment's ban on re-examination of facts tried by a jury applied to a case coming from the state courts, Chicago, Burlington and
Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 243-246 (1897); The Justices v.
Murray, 9 Wall. 274 (1869); see generally Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 431
(1830), we found the argument without merit, relying on our statement in
Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U. S. 380, 385-386 (1927) that review of findings of
fact is appropriate "where a conclusion of law as to a Federal right and a
finding of fact are so intermingled as to make it necessary, in order to pass
upon the Federal question, to analyze the facts."
Z!lJustice Harlan, the lone dissenter in Time, Inc. v. Pape, observed that
the Court had merely refound the facts in the case, but agreed that the
Court was free to examine for itself the evidentiary bases upon which the
decision below rested. He argued that this power need not be exercised in
every case, but rather independent review of the evidence should be lim-

I
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In Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U. S. 265, 277 (1971)
the Court held "as a matter of constitutional law" that the
jury could not be allowed to determine the relevance of a
defamatory statement to the plaintiff's status as a public figure. We explained that the jury's application of such a
standard "is unlikely to be neutral with respect to the content
of speech and holds a real danger of becoming an instrument
for the suppression of those 'vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks,' New York Times, supra,
at 270, which must be protected if the guarantees of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments are to prevail." Ibid. 29
The requirement of independent appellate review reiterated in New York Times v. Sullivan is a rule of federal constitutional law. It emerged from the exigency of deciding
concrete cases; it is law in its purest form under our common
law heritage. It reflects a deeply held conviction that
judges-and particularly members of this Court-must exercise such review in order to preserve the precious liberties
established and ordained by the Constitution. The question
whether the evidence in the record in a defamation case is of
the convincing clarity required to strip the utterance of First
Amendment protection is not merely a question for the trier
of fact. Judges, as expositors of the Constitution, must independently decide whether the evidence in the record is sufficient to cross the constitutional threshold that bars the entry of any judgment that is not supported by clear and
convincing proof of "actual malice."
ited to cases in which certain "unusual factors" exist, such as "allegations of
harrassment." 401 U. S., at 294.
29
A similar concern with the need to "preserve the right of free speech
both from suppression by tyrannous, well-meaning majorities and from
abuse by irresponsible, fanatical minorities," Schaefer v. United States,
251 U. S., at 482 (1920) (dissenting opinion) was identified by Justice Brandeis in explaining the special risk in allowing jurors to evaluate the character of the "clear and present danger" presented by arguably seditious
speech.
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III
The Court of Appeals was correct in its conclusions (1) that
there is a significant difference between proof of actual malice 30 and mere proof of falsity, and (2) that such additional
proof is lacking in this case.
The factual portion of the District Court's opinion may
fairly be read as including the following findings: (1)
Seligson's actual perception of the apparent movement of the
sound source at the time the Bose 901 was tested was "along
the wall" rather than "about the room"; (2) even when the
words in the disputed sentence are read in the context of the
entire article, neither the "average reader," nor any other
intelligent person, would interpret the word "about" to mean
"across"~ (3) Seligson is an intelligent, well educated person;
(4) the words "about the room" have the same meaning for
Seligson as they do for the populace in general; and (5) although he was otherwise a credible witness, Seligson's testimony that (a) he did not "know what made me pick that particular choice of words" and (b) that the word "about" meant
what he had drawn on the board, is not credible.
When the testimony of a witness is not believed, the trier
of fact may simply disregard it. Normally the discredited
testimony is not considered a sufficient basis for drawing a
contrary conclusion. See Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co., 340 U. S. 573, 575 (1951). In this case the trial
judge found it impossible to believe that Seligson continued
to maintain that the word "about" meant "across."
Seligson's testimony does not rebut any inference of actual
malice that the record otherwise supports, but it is equally
80
The burden of proving "actual malice" requires the plaintiff to demonstrate with clear and convincing evidence that the defendant realized that
his statement was false or that he subjectively entertained serious doubt as
to the truth of his statement. See, e. g., New York Times v. Sullivan,
supra, 376 U. S., at 280; see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, supra, 418 U. S.,
at 342; St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U. S. 727, 731 (1968); see generally
W. Prosser, Handbook on the Law of Torts 771-772, 821 (4th ed. 1971).
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clear that it does not constitute clear and convincing evidence
of actual malice. Seligson displayed a capacity for rationalization. He had made a mistake and when confronted
with it, he refused to admit it and steadfastly attempted to
maintain that no mistake had been made-that the inaccurate
was accurate. That attempt failed, but the fact that he made
the attempt does not establish that he realized the
innaccuracy at the time of publication.
Aside from Seligson's vain attempt to defend his statement
as a precise description of the nature of the sound movement,
the only evidence of actual malice on which the District Court
relied was the fact that the statement was an inaccurate description of what Seligson had actually perceived. Seligson
of course had insisted "I know what I heard." The trial
court took him at his word, and reasoned that since he did
know what he had heard, and he knew that the meaning of
the language employed did not accurately reflect what he
heard, he must have realized the statement was inaccurate at
the time he wrote it. "Analysis of this kind may be adequate
when the alleged libel purports to be an eyewitness or other
direct account of events that speak for themselves." Time,
Inc. v. Pape, supra, 401 U. S., at 279. See generally The
Santissima Tinidad, 7 wheat. 283, 338-339 (1822). Here,
however, adoption of the language chosen was "one of a number of possible rational interpretations" of an event "that
bristled with ambiquities" and descriptive challenges for the
writer. Time, Inc. v. Pape, supra, 401 U. S., at 290. The
choice of such language, though reflecting a misconception,
does not place the speech beyond the outer limits of the First
Amendment's broad protective umbrella. Under the District Court's analysis, any individual using a malapropism
might be liable, simply because an intelligent speaker would
have to know that the term was inaccurate in context, even
though he did not realize his folly at the time.
The statement in this case represents the sort of inaccuracy that is commonplace in the forum of robust debate to
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which the New York Times rule applies. I d., at 292. "Realistically, . . . some error is inevitable; and the difficulties of
separating fact from fiction convinced the Court in New York
Times, Butts, Gertz, and similiar cases to limit liability to instances where some degree of culpability is present in order
to eliminate the risk of undue self-censorship and the suppression of truthful material." Herbert v. Lando, 441 U. S.
153, 171-172 (1979). "[E]rroneous statement is inevitable in
free debate, and ... must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the 'breathing space' that they 'need . . .
to survive.'" New York Times v. Sullivan, supra, 376
U. S., at 271-272 (citation omitted).
The Court of Appeals entertained some doubt concerning
the ruling that the New York Times rule should be applied to
a claim of product disparagement based on a critical review of
a loudspeaker system. We express no view on that ruling,
but having accepted it for purposes of deciding this case, we
agree with the Court of Appeals that the difference between
hearing violin sounds move around the room and hearing
them wander back and forth fits easily within the breathing
space that gives life to the First Amendment. We may accept all of the purely factual findings of the District Court and
nevertheless hold as a matter of law that the record does not
contain clear and convincing evidence that Seligson or his employer prepared the loudspeaker article with knowledge that
it contained a false statement, or with reckless disregard of
the truth.
It may well be that in this case, the "finding" of the District
Court on the actual malice question could have been set aside
under the clearly erroneous standard of review, and we share
the concern of the Court of Appeals that the statements at
issue tread the line between fact and opinion. Moreover, the
analysis of the central legal question before us may seem out
of place in a case involving a dispute about the sound quality
of a loudspeaker. But though the question presented
reaches us on a somewhat peculiar wavelength, we reaffirm
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the principle of independent appellate review that we have
applied uncounted times before. We hold that the clearly erroneous standard of Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure does not prescribe the standard of review to be applied in reviewing a determination of actual malice in a case
governed by New York Times v. Sullivan. 31 Appellate
judges in such a case must exercise independent judgment
and determine whether the record establishes actual malice
with convincing clarity.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

31
There are, of course, many findings of fact in a defamation case that
are irrelevant to the constitutional standard of New York Times v. Sullivan and to which the clearly erroneous standard of Rule 52(a) is fully applicable.
Indeed, it is not actually necessary to review the "entire" record
to fulfill the function of independent appellate review on the actual malice
question; rather, only those portions of the record which relate to the actual malice determination must be independently assessed. The independent review function is not equivalent to a "de novo" review of the ultimate
judgment itself, in which a reviewing court makes an original appraisal of
all the evidence to decide whether or not it believes that judgment should
be entered for plaintiff. If the reviewing Court determines that actual
malice has been established with convincing clarity, the judgment of the
trial court may only be reversed on the ground of some other error of law
or clearly erroneous finding of fact. Although the Court of Appeals stated
that it must perform a de novo review, it is plain that the Court of Appeals
did not overturn any factual finding to which Rule 52(a) would be applicable, but instead engaged in an independent assessment only of the evidence germane to the actual malice determination.
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THE CHIEF" .JUSTICE

November 11, 1983

No. 82-1246 - Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc.
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
Further consideration, particularly on the points Lewis made
at Conference, persuades me to vote to affirm in this case.

PRESS LAW
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T 2:00 P.M. on Nov. 8, media
lawyers will start holding their
collective breath. That is when
the U.S. Supreme Court will hear
argument in Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union of the United States Inc. ,I a case
that may turn out to be the most
significant libel decision by the court
in years.
Media lawyers are concerned that
the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in Bose foreshadows a reversal
of the 1st U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
ruling, which was consistent with
Supreme Court decisions, that the
First Amendment requires appellate
courts to scrutinize closely and independently trial courts' findings of
actual malice in libel cases.
These concerns are well-founded.
The Supreme Court has not ruled in
favor of the press in a libel case for 12
years, since its 1971 decisions in
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia 2 ; Time
Inc. v. Pape 3 ; and Monitor Patriot Co.
v . Roy. • In fact, it is not too much to
say that, ever since that time, the
court has been slowly but surely chipping away at the First Amendment
protection of the media in libel cases
that was established in 1964 by the
Warren Court's landmark decision in
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.•
In none of these cases, however, did
the court overrule, at lease explicitly,
any aspect of the Sullivan decision. But
there is a chance that the court in Bose

dividual instruments heard through
the Bose system . . . tended to wander
about the room" was false and disparaging.l0 And it went on to hold that
Consumers Union made the false statement with a high degree of awareness

The Supreme Court has
not ruled in fovor of
the press in a libel
case for 12 years. Bose
may change all that.

a false statement is actionable only if
there is clear and convincing evidence
that it was made with actual
knowledge ofJts falsity or if the defendant entertained serious doubts as to
its truth.
The court concluded that Bose was
a public figure for purposes of evaluation of its newly designed speakers, by
virtue of having thrust itself into the
"vortex" of public discussion about
those speakers. It then held that a
number of the statements in the article
challenged by plaintiff were either not
false or not disparaging.•
However, the court determined that
the article's statement that "in-
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Bose Before the Supreme Court:
Turning Tables in Libel Cases?

By James C. Goodale

22

"

Mr. Goodale is a member of the
New York law firm of Debevoise &
Plimpton. He was assisted in the
prepara(ion of this article by Steven
Klugman, an associate with that firm.

the Supreme Court (ano bY impucauon
all appellate courts) must " 'make an
independent examination of the whole
record' . . . so as to assure ourselves
that the judgment does not constitute a
forbidden intrusion o-n the field of
freedom of expression. " 8 That principle has been reaffirmed in numerous
Supreme Court decisions since -sullivan.7
Bose involved a claim by a wellknown Framingham, Mass., stereospeaker manufacturer for product disparagement in a 1970 piece in Consumer Reports. The article was an
evaluation of the quality and performance of 24 stereo speakers, including
a sidebar piece about the new and distinctive speaker designed by Bose.
Although most of the account of the
Bose speakers was either background
description or complimentary, the article went on to say that the testing
listeners were unable to determine the
location of instruments heard through
the Bose speakers. The piece also
stated that such instruments "seemed
to grow to gigantic proportions and
tended to wander about the room."
The article added that these effects
"might become annoying" in listening
to solo performers. The Consumer
Reports piece ended without any
recommendation for or against
purchasing Bose speakers but merely
stated that the Bose system was "so
unusual that a prospective buyer must
Usten to it and judge it for himself. " 8
The District Court held the appropriate standard for liability in a
product-disparagement case 'where
the plaintiff is a public figure is the
"actual malice" standard set forth in
Sullivan and subsequent cases: that is,

\

HE DISTRICT Court believed
the engineer when he said that
his sensory perception "moved
along the wall," but discredited his
testimony that he meant to convey that
by the words he used. The court stated
that it was "simply impossible for the
court to believe that he interpret[ed] a
commonplace word such as 'about' to
mean anything other than its plain, ordinary meaning. " 11 The court held that
the use of "about the room" instead of
"along the wall" was false and disparaging and, on that skimpy basis,
Bose was awarded a judgment. After a
hearing on damages, the District Court
awarded Bose some $211,000 (about
$115,000 plus interest) in damages. 12
On appeal, the 1st Circuit reversed
the liability ruling on the ground that
there Was, as a matter of law, no clear
and convincing evidence of actual malice (which the Firs.t Amendment
requires for a finding of actual malice
under Sullivan _and later decisions). In
other words, the circuit court held
there was no evidence that the statement that instruments tended to
"wander about the room" was
published with knowledge that it was
false or reckless disregard of whether
it was false. (The court first considered, but did not decide, whether
the statement was one of opinion.)

T

its conclusion on the testimony of the
engineers who tested the Bose
speakers and prepared the article.
Those engineers testified that they
perceived the individual notes played
over the Bose speakers as emanating
from various points between the
speakers. One of the engineers explained that, when he wrote in the article that instruments "wander about
the room," he meant to convey that his
sensory perception of the instruments
"moved along the wall" between the
two speakers.

jur
go
lik
esp
pro
scr
tria
fin
jud
tria
on
wa
by
Wa
the
aga
Ta
als

act
po
me
ne
an
ar
co
Yo
C
re
ab
sio
tai
is
sig
wi
tio
ar
thr

pr
A
ca
ta
pr
act
be
err

Monday, November 14, 1983

THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

Close judicial scrutiny of actual-malice verdicts
at all court levels is absolutely vital if the
Sullivan rule is to provide the First Amendment
protection intended by the court in that case.
Continued from preceding page

not ruled on the applicability of Sullivan to a product-disparagement
claim, the court reached its conclusion
on the basis of other court decisions
and an analysis of the interests served
by the free flow of information about
consumer products, on the one hand,
and the protection of the reputation of
a manufacturer's product, on the
other.
The holding that the conditional
First Amendment privilege as
recognized in Sullivan is available in
product-disparagement cases brought
by corporations seems to be consistent, and perhaps even required by, recent Supreme Court decisions holding
that commercial speech is entitled to
First Amendment protection. 19 This
holding could be extremely significant
in bringing product-disp11ragement
cases -into the mainstream of libel actions, and it has not been challenged
before the 1st Circuit or the Supreme
Court. 20
More importantly, on close analysis
Bose raises a sobering example of just
how vulnerable our most respected
publications are becoming to libel
litigation and libel judgments. Keep in
mind that the defendant in Bose was
not a sensationalist tabloid like the
National Enquirer and not even a newspaper with muckraking investigative
reporting like the Washington Post.
Rather it was th«;_ highly respected,
and staid, Consumer Reports.
Also keep in mind that the disparagement that was the basis of a sixfigure verdict was not a diatribe
against a product or a malicious assault on it. (Bose tried to present the
a rticle in that light, but the trial court
totally rejected those efforts.) Rather,
liability was based on the trial court's
decision that the engineer who wrote
the review was imprecise in his selection of three words, and on its belief

FTC Rule
Continued from page 4

said : "A compensated expert witness
normally already has a financial interest in the litigation," one the FTC
believes won't be significantly in,·
creased if the expert also crossexamines.
The agency expressed confidence
that lawyers who appear before it will
be able to make "sensible judgments"
about when their clients will be best
served by cross-examination conducted by a non-lawyer.
And many lawyers welcome that
opportunity to let non-lawyers crossexamine. "I'm not sure it's already not
the law," says William H. Allen of
Washington's Covington & Burling,
who has an administrative law practice. "If the party thinks it will help
him, what's wrong with it?"
Dean Ernest Gellhorn of Case
Western Reserve University School of
Law agrees. "I see no reason lawyers
have to have a monopoly on every
asnect of the administrative orocess."

that he was knowingly , imprecise,
based solely on the court's disbelief ot
his testimony. Imposing liability on
that basis allows virtually a zero
margin for error in commentary by
the press.
In Sullivan, the Supreme Court held
that the First Amendment precludes a
rule of liability based on falsity alone
because that rule "dampens the vigor
and limits the variety of public
debate. " 21 If the Supreme Court orders
reinstatement of the trial court's judg·
ment, as Bose requests, the court will
have taken a giant step backward
toward endorsing that rule.
(1) 508 F . Supp. 1249 (D. Mass . 1980), rev'd, 692

F, 2d 189 (1st Clr. 1982), cert. granted,- U.S.-,
102 S. Ct. 1872 (1983).
(2) 403 u.s. 29 (1971).
(3) 401 u.s. 279 (1971).
( 4) 401 u.s. 265 (1971) .
(5) 376 u.s. 254 (1964).
(6) 376 U.S. at 285, quoting "Edwards v. South
Carolina, 372 U.S. 229,, 235 (1963).
(7) See, e.g., Nat'! Assoc. of Letter Carriers v.
Austin, 418 U .S. 264, 282 (1974); Greenbelt Coop.
Pub . Assoc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970); Picker·
ing v. Bd, of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968); St.
Amant v . Thompson, 390 U .S. 727 (1968).
(8) 508 F. Supp. at 1252·54.
(9) Id. at 1260·67.
(10) Id . at 1267·69.
(11) Id. at 1277.
(12) 529 F . Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1981).
(13) 692 F .2d 197.
(14) Id . at 195.
(15) See n . 7, supra.
(16) Libel Defense Resource Center Bulletin,
No.6, at 2 (Winter 1983).
(17) Libel Defense Resource Center Bulletin,
No.1, at 21 (Spring-Summer 1983) .
(18) Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., 567 F.
Supp. 651 (D.D.C. 1983).
(19) See, e .g., In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982);
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm ., 447 U .S . 557 (1980); Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Virginia Pharmacy
Bd. v . Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
u.s. 748 (1976) .
(20) On Bose's appeal to the 1st Circuit, a concurring judge emphasized that the 1st Circuit was
not passing on the District Court's finding that
Bose was a public figure . 692 F . 2d at 197.
(21) 376 U .S. at 279.
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